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LIMITED LIABILITY WITH ONE-MAN COMPANIES
AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS
Bm Nmw F. CATALDO*
Limited liability, usually regarded as the most significant feature of corporate
enterprise, has received extravagant praise. Among those who have paid verbal
homage to the concept of limited liability are two former university presidents who
cut a large figure in the intellectual manners of the nation during the last half
century. President Eliot of Harvard regarded limited liability as "the corporation's
most precious characteristic" and "by far the most effective legal invention ...
made in the nineteenth century."' President Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia
made the pronouncement in i91: "I weigh my words when I say that in my judg-
ment the limited liability corporation is the greatest single discovery of modern
times.... Even steam and electricity are far less important than the limited liability
corporation, and they would be reduced to comparative impotence without it."'
Our courts have rested-unnecessarily, it is believed 3 -the concept of limited lia-
bility on the legal entity theory. This theory, familiar to every elementary student
of corporation law and finance, treats the corporation as a legal persona or juristic
person constituting an entity in itself separate and distinct from the members. The
essence of this theory, stated in stark terms, is that the shareholders own "the
corporation" and the latter owns and operates the assets and the business. The
questionable4 but judicially accepted reasoning which regards limited liability as a
* A.B. 1929, LL.B. 1932, LL.M. 1936, University of Pennsylvania. Member of Philadelphia bar;
Special Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., 1935-36; Chief Price Attorney, Office of
Price Administration, Philadelphia Regional Office, 1943-45; Professor of Business Law and Chairman of
the Department, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Contributor to legal and other periodicals.
'Quoted in Cook, "Watered Stock"--Commissions---"Blue Skay Laws"-Stock Without Par Value,
19 MiCH. L. REv. 583 n. 4 (1921).
'Quoted in I WILLIAm M. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA Os THE LAw or CoRpoRAIoNs §21 (1917). See
Berl, The Vanishing Distinction Between Creditors and Stockholders, 76 U. os PA. L. REv. 814, 815
(1928). See also Dodd, The Evolution of Limited Liability in American Industry: Massachusetts, 6x
H-Iv. L. REv. 1351 (1948).
a It is not intended to pursue here the old and fruitless quarrel engendered by the "nature of corporate-
ness." The legal entity theory has taken deep root in our legal system and continues to flourish, though
as far back as 1884, one writer decried the theory as a vestigial organ requiring excision. HENRY 0.
TAYLOR, PRIvATE CosuoRtxroNs iv (s884). See Machen, Corporate Personality, 24 I-Atv. L. REv. 347,
352 (igii); FREDERICK HALs, CORPORATE PEassoNA.LiTs Ixi (1930).
'See preceding note. See also I. MAURICE WOuISER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE Fscsm.o AND
ALLIED CORPORATION PROBLEMS 29 (1927); ADOLF A. BRt.E, STUDIES IN THE LAw or CORPORATE
FINANCE C. 1 (1928); ALExANDER H. FREY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS AND Pa'NFsRsS
51 (i951); Koessler, The Person in Imagination or Persona Ficta of the Corporation, 9 LA. L. REv.
435 (1949).
Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CAL. L. Rxv. Ia, 20 (925),
states that the entity theory is the "basic theory of corporation law."
A new concept in the field is set forth by Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 Co.. L. REv.
343 (1947).
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result flowing out of the legal entity theory follows a simple route: The corporation
is a separate entity; hence the obligations incurred in the operation of the business
are those of the corporation itself, and the shareholders are not personally liable
on those obligations.
The extent to which the courts have gone in upholding the doctrine of corporate
entity and its companion, limited liability, finds vivid illustration in those cases
which concern the closest of close corporations-the one-man company, the family
corporation, and the subsidiary corporation.
I
THE ONE-MAN COMPANY AND FAMILY CORPORATION5
The evolution of the one-man company and the family corporation is found in
the desire to combine limited liability with the complete dominion of the sole pro-
prietorship.6 A sole proprietor, operating a moderate sized business, organizes a
corporation to which he surrenders the business and assets. In return he takes all
the shares excepting the few necessary to comply with the statutory provisions re-
specting incorporators and directors. The few shares he does not take are allotted to
his relatives or employees, in order to qualify them as incorporators or directors in
accordance with the requirements of the corporation statute. Thus, a corporation is
created "in legal form," the sole or principal shareholder retains in effect the ex-
clusive control and full dominion he enjoyed as a sole proprietor, and in addition
he achieves the desired privilege of limited liability.7
It is most doubtful whether the concept of corporate enterprise was ever intended
or designed to embrace this institution.' Nevertheless the one-man company and the
family corporation have become familiar modes of business enterprise and, despite
occasional questioning by a court9 or a writer,'0 have generally received judicial
Fuller, The Incorporated Individual. A Study of the One-Man Company, 51 HARv. L. Rrv. 1373
(1938); Masten, "One Man Companies" and Their Controlling Shareholders, 14 CAN. BAn REv. 663
(1936); Note, One Man Corporations-Scope and Limitations, 1oo U. OF PA. L. REv 853 (1952).
' Occasionally there have been other motives for the formation of one-man companies. Some of
these other motives have been: a married man's wish to avoid the incidents of dower with respect
to certain realty, a person's desire to avoid the operation of a usury statute which applies to individuals
but not to corporations, the desire to facilitate the management and sale of property. See Fuller, supra
note 5, at 1374.
'Note, 45 HARV. L. REv. 1084 (1932).
'Rutledge, Significant Trends in Modern Incorporation Statutes, 22 WASH. U. L. Q. 305 (1937),
suggests a study to determine the advisability of having three types of corporation statutes: one for
the extensive business, another for the small or moderate sized businesss, another for the one-man com-
pany. See Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL L. Q. 488 (1948).
Note, "One Man Corporations"-Scope and Limitations, ioo U. OF PA. L. Rrv. 853, 868 (1952):
"Inasmuch as the one man corporation can be justified on economic and social grounds, and since it
has been recognized by the courts for over half a century, it would seem advisable that the legislatures
of the several states follow the lead of Michigan and Iowa and permit one man to form a corporation
and eliminate the board of directors. This would simplify the entire problem and dissolve the aura of
disrespectabilty and uncertainty which still hovers over the one man corporation."
' See Dollar Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. MacGregor, 163 Md. 105, x61 Ad. 159 (932).
" Note, 45 HAlv. L. REv. 1084, 1089 (1932): "Limited liability a protection designed to encourage
investment in corporations-would seem unnecessary where corporate ownership and control has been
concentrated in the hands of one man. An occasional questioning by the courts of the desirability of
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sanction and approval. The usual argument advanced by the courts is: Limited
liability is a privilege held out by the corporation law of the state; one who organizes
a one-man or family corporation, in compliance with the formalities of that law, for
the purpose of attaining limited liability in a commercial venture, is merely taking
advantage of a privilege conferred by law.'1 One might well question both the
logic and the historical realities in this judicially tailored reasoning. What is far
more important, however, is that this and similar reasoning indicates clearly a judicial
policy to sponsor the one-man company and the family corporation.' 2
A. Contractual Obligations
The fact that all or almost all the shares of a corporation are owned by one in-
dividual is not sufficient ground for disregarding corporate personality.' 3 This
view seems now too settled for dispute.' 4 Accordingly the distinction between the
corporate property and the individual property of the sole shareholder is carefully
preserved for legal purposes.'" The same is true of the distinction between corporate
obligations and the personal obligations of the sole shareholder. Corporate creditors
the one man corporation is indicative of this point of view." See I. MAURICE WORMISER, FRANKENSTEIN
INCORPORATED 9 5ff. ('93').
" Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 238 N. Y. 254, 144 N. E. 519 (1924); Salomon v. Saloman & Co., Ltd.
[1897] A. C. 22. See Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Sansom, [i921] 2 K. B. 492, 500, 125 L. T. R.
37.
'In Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Sansom, [1921] 2 K. B. 492, 514, i25 L. T. R. 37, Younger,
L. J., said: "Now, speaking for myself, I do in the light of these considerations, deprecate in connection
with what are called one-man companies, the too indiscriminate use of such words as simulacrum, sham,
or cloak-the terms found in this case-or indeed any other term of polite invective. Not only do
these companies exist under the sanction, even with the encouragement of the Legislature, but I have
no reason whatever to doubt that the great majority of them are as bona fide and genuine as in a busi-
ness sense they are convenient and suitable media for the provision and application of capital to industry.
No doubt there are amongst such companies, as amongst any other kind of association, black sheep;
but in my judgment such terms of reproach as I have alluded to should be strictly reserved for those
of them and of their directors who are shown to deserve condemnation, and I am quite satisfied that
the indiscriminate use of such terms has, not infrequently, led to results which are unfortunate and
unjust, and in my judgment this is no case for their use."
" Macan v. Scandinavia Belting Co., 264 Pa. 384, 391, 107 At. 750, 752 (1919): "A corporation
has a separate entity or existence, irrespective of the persons who own its stock, and this rule is not
altered by the fact that the greater portion or even the entire issue of stock happens to be held by one
person." See Star Brewing Co. v. Flynn, 237 Mass. 213, 129 N. E. 438 (i92I); Eichelberger v. Arling-
ton Building, Inc., 28o Fed. 997, 999 (D. C. Cir. X922).
"In re John Koke Co., 38 F. 2d 232, 233 (9 th Cir. 1930): "The rule is quite elementary that a
corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its stockholders, with separate and distinct rights
and liabilities; and this is true even though a single individual may own all, or nearly all, of the
capital stock."
Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 77 F. 2d 478, 487 (8th Cir. 1935): "Few questions of law are
better settled than that a corporation is ordinarily a wholly separate entity from its stockholders, whether
they be one or more." See Corley v. Cozart, 115 F. 2d i9, x2i (5 th Cir. 1940).
"The leading American decisions are Button v. Hoffman, 61 Wis. 20, 2o N. W. 667 (884), and
Parker v. Bethel Hotel Co., 96 Tenn. 252, 34 S. W. 209 (1896). In the Button case the sole share-
holder was unsuccessful in an action of replevin brought in his individual name to recover corporate
assets from one wrongfully in possession of them. See also Moroney v. Moroney, 286 S. W. 167 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1926). In the Parker case the court held inoperative the sole shareholder's attempt to
alienate corporate property in his individual name. Accord: Corley v. Cozart, XX5 F. 2d ri9 (5 th Cir.
1940). Cf. Earp v. Schmitz, 334 Ill. App. 382, 79 N. E. 2d 637 (1948). See WALTER H. ANDERSOu,
LImITATIONS OF CORPORATE ENTITY 97 (193).
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cannot obtain satisfaction from the sole shareholder and his individual property; 6
creditors of the sole shareholder cannot obtain satisfaction from the corporation and
corporate assets."7 The same general principle governs in the matter of set-off.' 8
For example, in a case where an insolvent bank held the deposit of a corporation
and the individual note of that corporation's sole shareholder, the latter was not
allowed to set off the amount of the deposit against his liability on the note."
This distinction between corporate and individual obligations and creditors, and
the ensuing limited liability of the sole shareholder, may be supported on extra-legal
and purely pragmatic grounds. The obligee of a contractual obligation has an
opportunity of knowing and choosing his obligor. He should know with whom he
is dealing and should be bound by his choice. If insolvency overtakes the sole share-
holder, or the corporation, or both, it is necessary to weigh the respective positions
of those who dealt with the business on a corporate basis and those who dealt with
the sole shareholder as an individual. The equities of the former are no greater than
those of the latter. The former will be limited to the corporate assets; the latter, to
the individual assets. By this marshalling, the equal equities of both groups are
preserved, in the usual and ordinary case.
As a simple example, suppose a draft names a corporate drawee. The draft is
accepted by the drawee in the corporate name and is later discounted by a bank.
It turns out that the acceptor is a one-man company. The bank may not hold that
company's sole shareholder liable on the instrument, even though the company
becomes insolvent and is unable to pay.20 The acceptance appearing on the instru-
ment was in a corporate name and the bank had an opportunity to determine the real
identity of the acceptor before it discounted the draft. The bank receives all it
bargained for when it is given a legal remedy on the instrument against the corpora-
tion. If the bank and other corporate creditors were permitted to hold the sole
shareholder liable, the latter's individual assets would be depleted at the possible ex-
pense of his personal creditors who dealt with him as an individual and should
have priority in his personal assets.
It is a fair guess that courts are motivated by these considerations, 2' although they
"eLouisville Banking Co. v. Eisenman, 94 Ky. 83, 21 S. W. 531 (1893). See ROBERT S. STEVENS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 75 (2d ed. 1949): "When one extends credit to a
corporation, he may not, upon the insolvency of the corporation, claim satisfaction out of the indi-
vidual property of the sole shareholder .... ." See EDWARD H. WARREN, SELECT CASES AND OTIIR
AursoRmnEs ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 89 note (19x6, Reprint of 1930). Cl. Re O'Brien,
4o F. 2d 554 (D. Minn. 1930).
"'In re John Koke Co., 38 F. 2d 232 (9 th Cir. r930); Geary v. Cain, 79 Utah 268, 9 P. 2d 396
(1932). See Star Brewing Co. v. Flynn, 237 Mass. 213, 129 N. E. 438 (192z); Tinnin v. Wilkirson,
58 S. NV. 2d 69 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
"
8 Looney v. Thorpe Bros., 277 Fed. 367 (8th Cir. 1921); Gallagher v. Germania Brewing Co., 53
Minn. 214, 54 N. W. 1115 (r893). But see U. S. Gypsum Co. v. Mackey Wall Plaster Co., 6o Mont.
132, 199 Pac. 249 (192r). Cf. Gay v. Hudson River Electric Power Co., 187 Fed. r2 (2d Cir. 1911).
" State ex rel. Sorensen v. Weston Bank, r25 Neb. 612, 251 N. W. 164 (933). Accord: Dennis
v. Smith, 49 S. W. 2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
"
5 Louisville Banking Co. v. Eisenman, 94 Ky. 83, 21 S. W. 531 (1893).
" See the excerpt from Lord Herschell's opinion in Salomon v. Saloman & Co., Ltd. [1897] A. C.
22, quoted in note 31, infra. A recent case which seems to push this attitude too far, in view of the
LIMITED LIABILITY
generally prefer to place their decisions on the simple base of the legal entity theory.
A case which is unusual in this regard, because the "election" factor appears in bold
relief and the court mentions the conflicting equities of rival groups of creditors,
is In re John Koke Co.,2 decided in i93o by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. Here money was borrowed personally by the sole shareholder
of a corporation for the declared purpose of paying off corporate debts. Upon the
subsequent bankruptcy of both the shareholder and the corporation, the lender sought
to share as a corporate creditor with a claim against the corporate assets. The court
denied his claim and said that since he knew the purpose of the loan he was "bound
by the election thus made, in view of the possible intervening rights of other credi-
tors."
B. Tort Liability
The foregoing reasoning would not be applicable to tort liability. Needless to
say, in the ordinary case the victim of a tort does not rely on, deal with, or choose his
tortfeasor. It is conceivable, therefore, that courts might distinguish in this con-
nection between contractual obligations and tort liability. They might refuse to
sponsor limited liability for the sole shareholder in the one-man company with re-
spect to "strangers" injured by a tort committed in the execution of the corporate
business, although they have sustained limited liability for such a shareholder with
respect to contractual obligations. The courts have, however, neither drawn nor
honored this distinction. The sole or principal shareholder has been held not to be
personally liable to a party injured by the negligent act of a corporate employee,23
or by the negligent maintenance of the corporate property.2 4 In the leading case to
this effect, decided by one of our most respected tribunals, the plaintiff was injured
by reason of the faulty construction and negligent maintenance of a building, which
was owned and operated by a realty company and had been leased by it to various
tenants. The New York Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff, an employee of
one of the tenants, had no right of action against the principal shareholder of the
realty company. The court exclaimed: 25
The fact that it is a family corporation, so to speak, is nothing suspicious or illegal.
Innumerable are the corporations wherein all the stock is owned by a few members of
one family. The fact that one man may own all but a few shares of the stock, and be
particular circumstances there disclosed, is Westervel's Sons v. Regency, Inc., 63 A. 2d 818 (N. J. Super.
Ch. 1948), af'd, 3 N. J. Super. 173, 65 A. 2d 776 (1949). Here the court said (p. 82o): "The plaintiff
contracted with Regency, Inc. Presumably plaintiff intended to look to the assets of Regency, Inc. for
the payment of its claim. Had plaintiff intended to charge the van Doos personally it would have
insisted upon having them join in the contract. All the plaintiff can ask is that the assets of Regency,
Inc. shall be made available for the payment of its claim. The fact that there are other claims and
that bankruptcy has intervened does not alter the situation."
22 38 F. 2d 232, 233 (9 th Cir. 1930).
" Sayers v. Navillus Oil Co., 41 S. W. 2d 5o6 (Tex. Civ. App. 3931); Hayhurst v. Boyd, 50 Idaho
752, 300 Pac. 895 (3931). Cf. Cooper v. Industrial Commission, 74 Ariz. 35r, 249 P. 2d 342 (952);
Price v. Old Label Liquor Co., 23 N. J. Super. 165, 92 A. 2d 8o6 (x952).
=' Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 238 N. Y. 254, 144 N. E. 539 (1924).
Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 238 N. Y. at 26o, 262, 144 N. E. at 52i.
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in fact the dominant and controlling factor or the only active manager of the corporation,
is no evidence in and of itself that the corporation does not exist as a person in the eyes
of the law, actually owning, operating, and controlling property. . . . Many a man in-
corporates his business or his property and is the dominant and controlling feature of the
corporation. He may do so for the very purpose of escaping personal liability, and he
may do so as a cover if in fact the corporation really exists-is doing business as permitted
by the laws of this state or the state of its incorporation; in other words, is a person recog-
nized by the law.
In the cases found dealing with this problem the tort concerned was negligence.
There is a question whether the same rule should govern respecting tortious mis-
conduct which is intentional or deliberate, such as the tort of assault or false im-
prisonment committed in the execution of the corporate business by an employee or
by the sole shareholder himself. Conceivably the sole shareholder might be denied
the privilege of limited liability when he has himself committed a tort of this char-
acter within the scope of the corporate business26 It is likely, though, that the courts
will, without distinction, apply the broad standard of limited liability to both
classes of torts, just as they have, without distinction, upheld limited liability for
both contractual obligations and tort liability for negligence 27
C. The Sole Shareholder as a Corporate Creditor
It is natural for the courts, having proceeded to this point, to hold that the sole
shareholder may lend money to the business and share as a corporate creditor upon
the subsequent insolvency of the venture s Indeed, the sole or principal share-
holder may become a secured corporate creditor and thus acquire priority over the
unsecured corporate creditors. This position was sustained by the eminent authority
of the English House of Lords a half century ago in Salomon v. Salomon & Co.,
Ltd..9 a decision which haunts every discussion of corporate entity and limited
liability. The essential facts of this celebrated case were that Salomon, a prosperous
sole proprietor in the boot and shoe business, desirous of achieving limited liability,
formed a corporation with an authorized share capital of 40,000 pounds (40,000 shares
" A decision which seems to sustain this position, without any explanation or discussion of the
matter, is found in the case of Jackson v. Kirschman, 175 So. 105 (La. App. 1937).
27In Geary v. Cain, 79 Utah 268, 9 P. 2d 396 (1932), the plaintiff was assaulted by C and obtained
judgment against C. He sought to reach, in satisfaction of this judgment, the assets of a family corpora-
tion of which C was actually the sole shareholder, but did not succeed. At first glance it seems as
if a new and startling type of spendthrift trust is being sanctioned whereby a hothead may transfer
his assets to a corporation and thus place them beyond the reach of those whom he intentionally harms
in the future. The case is hardly so ominous and its significance seems to be primarily proccdural. C's
shares are his personal property, and the plaintiff, like any other creditor of C, may reach those shares
in satisfaction of the judgment entered against C. In this way the plaintiff will reach C's net worth in
the corporate venture, without injury to the corporate creditors. The equities of the corporate creditors,
who have priority in the corporate assets, and of the plaintiff, who has a claim against the sole shareholder
as an individual, are kept in balance.
"'Wheeler v. Smith, 30 F. 2d 59, 61 (9th Cir. 192a9): "While the claim of a. sole stockholder
against a bankrupt corporation should be scrutinized with care, it is not the law that such a claim should
be rejected merely because the claimant is such sole stockholder." See Peckett v. Wood, 234 Fed. 833
(3 d Cir. 1916); Gardner v. Rutherford, 57 Cal. App. 2d 874, 136 P. 2d 48 (1943). Cl. Pott v.
Schmucker, 84 Md. 535, 36 At. 592 (1897).
" f1897] A. C. 22.
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with a par value of I pound each). He surrendered his solvent business at the
overvalued figure of 39,000 pounds to the corporation. In return the corporation
assumed the obligation of paying off the debts of the old business, amounting to
ooo pounds, and Salomon received 20,001 shares and ioo debentures. The latter
had a par value of ioo pounds each and represented a lien on the corporate assets.
His wife and five children, who served as the incorporators along with him, were
allotted one share each, and no other shares were ever issued. Salomon and two
sons constituted the board of directors, and Salomon was appointed chairman of the
board and managing director. On the security of his debentures Salomon borrowed
from Broderip 5000 pounds, which were paid into the corporate treasury as a loan
from Salomon. As part of the transaction, the debentures held by Salomon were
cancelled, new debentures in the same amount were issued to Broderip, with the
understanding that Salomon was the "beneficial owner" of the new debentures, sub-
ject only to Broderip's prior security interest therein to the extent of the loan in
question. Business adversity, in the form of strikes in the trade and the govern-
ment's failure to give the number of orders anticipated, caused the corporation to
become insolvent. In liquidation proceedings instituted some fourteen months after
incorporation, it was held that: first, Broderip was entitled to full payment of his
claim; second, the balance of the assets, about iooo pounds, should go to Salomon
"as beneficial owner of the debentures"; third, the unsecured creditors, with claims
amounting to about 8ooo pounds, would receive nothing.
Salomon, the bootmaker, and Salomon & Co., Ltd., were distinct and separate
persons,3 0 the Lords argued, and the fact that he incorporated for the purpose of
achieving limited liability was of no moment, since limited liability is a legitimate
and permissible object of incorporation, conferred by the corporation law of the
realm.3 l
"0 Lord Herschell said (pp. 42-43): "Under these circumstances, I am at a loss to understand what
is meant by saying that A. Salomon & Co., Ltd., is but an 'alias' for A. Salomon. It is not another
name for the same person; the company is ex hypothesi a distinct legal persona. As little am I able to
adopt the view that the company was the agent of Salomon to carry on his business for him. In a pop-
ular sense, a company may in every case be said to carry on business for and on behalf of its share-
holders; but this certainly does not in point of law constitute the relation of principal and agent between
them or render the shareholders liable to indemnify the company against the debts which it incurs."
"' Lord Herschell declared (pp. 44-45, 46): "It is said that the respondent company is a 'one man'
company, and that in this respect it differs from such companies as those to which I have alluded. But
it has often happened that a business transferred to a joint stock company has been the property of
three or four persons only, and that the other subscribers of the memorandum have been clerks or other
persons who possessed little or no interest in the concern. I am unable to see how it can be lawful
for three or four or six persons to form a company for the purpose of employing their capital in trading,
with the benefit of limited liability, and not for one person to do so, provided, in each case, the require-
ments of the statute have been complied with and the company has been validly constituted. How does
it concern the creditor whether the capital of the company is owned by seven persons in equal shares,
with the right to an equal share of the profits, or whether it is almost entirely owned by one person, who
practically takes the whole of the profits? The creditor has notice that he is dealing with a company the
liability of the members of which is limited, and the register of shareholders informs him how the
shares are held, and that they are substantially in the hands of one person, if this be the fact. ...
But we have to interpret the law, not to make it; and it must be remembered that no one need trust a
limited liability company unless he so please, and that before he does so he can ascertain, if he so
please, what is the capital of the company, and how it is held."
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Some thirty years later the Maryland court, faced with the same issue, reached
a different conclusion and drily remarked: "This court does not think the law con-
templates that one may incorporate an established business of his own, continue to
own and control it as before, and at the same time, for his personal benefit, put
beyond the reach of prospective creditors all the assets of the corporation." 2
D. Disregard of Corporate Personality
The concept of corporate personality will be sustained only so long as it is
invoked and employed for legitimate purposes. Courts will not sanction a per-
version of the concept to improper uses and dishonest ends. A perversion is clearly
perceived when the notion of corporateness is used as a device to perpetuate fraud,
to evade the law, or to escape obligations 3  In cases of this gender the courts do
"Dollar Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. MacGregor, 163 Md. 1o5, 1o9, x6x At. 159, 161 (1932).
Professor Ripley's sentiments were the same. Speaking of the Salomon case, he said: "The House of
Lords, on the other hand, concluded the matter by holding that, inasmuch as all legal formalities had
been duly observed, there was no fraud. Fraud or no fraud, to the lay mind the whole flimsy pretext
more than borders on the ridiculous. It rather controverts the famous characterization of Disraeli, that
'the legal mind chiefly displayed itself in illustrating the obvious, explaining the evident, and expatiating
on the commonplace.'" WILLiAm Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND VALL STREET 64-65 (1927).
Complete approval of the Salomon case was expressed in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Sansom,
[1921] 2 K. B. 492, 125 L. T. R. 37.
One writer, speaking in 1936, said that "the principle of the Salomon Case stands unimpaired."
Masten, One Man Companies and Their Controlling Shareholders, 14 CAN. BAR. Rav. 663, 671 (1936).
33 United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247, 255 (C. C. E. D. Wis. 19o5):
"If any general rule can be laid down, in the present state of authority, it is that a corporation will be
looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but,
when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or
defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons." See Eichelberger v.
Arlington Building, Inc., 28o Fed. 997, 999 (D. C. Cir. 1922); Kutz Canon Oil & Gas. Co. v. Harr,
56 N. M. 358, 244 P. 2d 522, 527 (1952).
Pacific Can Co. v. Hewes, 95 F. 2d 42, 45 (gth Cir. 1938): "A familiar principle of law has been
that a corporation is an entity, distinct in itself. It is true that when resourcefulness of man caused a
corporation to be used as a scapegoat for another, courts checked the evil."
Ruberoid Co. v. North Texas Concrete Co., 193 F. 2d 121, 122 (5 th Cir. 1951): "The doctrine of
separate entity fills a useful purpose in business life, and the courts are hesitant to disregard it unless
the facts presented demonstrate some misuse of the corporate privilege or the need of limiting it in order
to do justice."
The problem is pursued at length in the article by Horowitz, Disregarding the Entity of Private
Corporations, 14 WAsH. L. REv. 285 (939), 15 WAm. L. REv. 1 (1940). See also Note, Piercing the
Corporate Veil, 4 U. op FLA. L. REV. 352 (95i). A special aspect of this problem, dealing with the
corporation as a "person" under the New York usury law, is found in Note, 38 CORtNELL L. Q. 93
(1952).
Some of the schemes are so transparent as to leave one incredulous. It is a fair guess, though, that
for each scheme which is brought before the courts and judicially unraveled at great expense to the
litigant, there are many which do not reach the courts and are successful.
In Great Oak Bldg. Ass'n v. Rosenheim, 341 Pa. 132, 19 A. 2d 95 (1941), the plaintiff held a
mortgage on property owned by the defendant, who transferred it to a one-man company created for
the purpose with an authorized share capital of $5oo. Of the 100 shares authorized he took 98, and
his wife and daughter each took one. The corporation assumed the obligation to pay off the mortgage
and to pay the defendant $5oo, in return for the transfer of property, and no cash or other assets were
paid or exchanged. The defendant continued to collect rents as he had in the past and put them in his
personal bank account, except for the amounts necessary to pay the expense of maintaining the property.
There were no corporate books and no corporate bank account. The whole purpose of the arrange-
ment was, the defendant conceded, to relieve him of personal liability on the mortgage debt. After
the foreclosure of the mortgage by the plaintiff, the latter was obliged to satisfy unpaid taxes on the
property. The defendant was held personally liable to reimburse the plaintiff for the amount of the
LIMITED LIABILITY
not permit parties to play hide-and-seek by assuming the dual role of human being,
on the one hand, and corporation, on the other. Acts done in corporate form
will be considered the individual acts of the members, 4 and acts done by the mem-
bers will be considered corporate acts0"
Though it is undeniable that the notion of corporate personality will be disre-
garded when invoked to "defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud,
or defend crime," it would be erroneous to assume that this general rule states the
limits of judicial action in the matter. There is a marked tendency to disregard
corporate personality in those cases where adherence to the concept of corporateness
will result in inequity or will prevent a full settlement of the dispute between the
taxes in question. The court said (34I Pa. at 137, i9 A. 2d at 97): "With this principle in mind, the
paper mask of the charter, because it is nothing more, will not be permitted to hide the features of the
individual behind it."
In Higgins v. Smith, 308 U. S. 473, 475 (1940), a one-man company was formed for the purpose
of buying securities from and selling securities to the sole shareholder. The shareholder was not per-
mitted to deduct a loss arising from the sale of securities from him to the corporation. The jury,
pursuant to instructions from the court, found that there was not a real transfer "out of Mr. Smith and
into something that existed separate and apart from him," but simply "a transfer by Mr. Smith's left
hand, being his individual hand, into his right hand, being his corporate hand, so that in truth and
fact there was no transfer at all." See Anderson v. Abbott, 32X U. S. 349 (1944).
"' Claude Neon Lights, Inc. v. Federal Neon Tube Corporation, 52 F. 2d x69 (S. D. N. Y. 1931);
Mosher v. Salt River Valley W. U. Ass'n, 39 Ariz. 567, 8 P. ad 1077 (1932); Veterans Service Club v.
Sweeney, 252 S. W. ad 25 (Ky. App. 1952); Biscayne Realty & Ins. Co. v. Ostend Realty Co., 1o9 Fla.
1, 148 So. 56o (933).
In the case last cited, Busch and his wife were engaged in the real estate business. He owned all
but a very few shares in a corporation which had no assets, did no business, and was used merely as a
medium for taking title to lands purchased by Busch. His practice was to buy land, take title in the
corporate name, and then have the title transferred from the corporate name to himself and/or his
wife. On one occasion he purchased realty, took tide in the corporate name, paid part of the price, and
for the balance gave the seller promissory notes executed in the corporate name. Title to the property
was then transferred from the corporate name to Busch. The promissory notes were not paid and the
seller sued the corporation and obtained judgment against it. Unable to collect the judgment from the
corporation, he asked the court to declare Busch personally liable on the notes and to subject Busch's
individual assets to payment of the judgment. The court gave the relief sought and said that the
corporation was a mere alter ego of Busch, who was in effect conducting an individual business under
a trade name. The court declared (1o9 Fla. at 1S, 148 So. at 564): "If the stockholders of a corpora-
tion enter into a transaction in their individual and private interests, and utilize the name of the corpora-
tion merely as a convenience for the completion of the transaction, where the legal entity as such has
no interest in the matter, but the name is used to mislead creditors or perpetuate a fraud upon them, the
legal entity in the name of which the transaction was carried will be ignored and the parties held to
individual liability." See also Bressman Inc. v. Mosson, 127 Misc. 282, 215 N. Y. Supp. 766
(ist Dep't x926); Shea v. Leonis, 14 Cal. 2d 666, 96 P. ad 332 (1939); Natelson v. A. B. L.
Holding Co., Inc., 26o N. Y. 233, 183 N. E. 373 (932), where the court said (260 N. Y. at 238, 183
N. E. at 374) that "liability, divorced from the means of meeting it, was the sole portion .of the
corporation. ... This, we think, pushes the theory of dual personality too far."
"
5 Norma Mining Co. v. Mackay, 241 Fed. 640 (9 th Cir. 1917); \Wenban Estate, Inc. v. Hewlett, 193
Cal. 675, 227 Pac. 723 (1924).
The two classical instances are People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 1a N. Y. 582, 24 N. E.
834 (i89o), and State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio 137, 30 N. E. 279 (1892).
A striking example is the case of the sole or principal shareholder who sets fire to corporate property.
Corporate personality is disregarded in order to prevent the shareholder from profiting by his own
wrong, and his incendiarism is considered a good defense to a suit brought by the corporation to recover
on its fire policy covering the property. Neily Co. v. London & Lancashire Fire Insurance Co., 148
Fed. 683 (3d Cir. z9o6). Accord: D. I. Felsenthal Co. v. Northern Assurance Co., 284 Ill. 343, 120
N. E. 268 (19x8). Cf. Firemen's Mutual Insurance Co. v. Aponaug Mfg. Co., 149 F. 2d 359 (5 th Cir.
1945).
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real parties in interest in a given situation3 6 Under the aegis of this fluid principle
a court may move freely in deciding a case on the merits.3
These sentiments have special significance with respect to one-man companies
and family corporations. Here the sole or principal shareholder, like Janus, repre-
sents and constitutes an incorporated venture, on one side, and an individual, on the
other side. His complete dominion and superior knowledge carry opportunities
for manipulation and maneuvering.38 Accordingly his privilege of limited liability
is conditioned on compliance with two requirementsY0 First, he must conduct
the business on a corporate footing and thereby maintain and preserve the
separate identity of the venture.4 ° Second, he must establish the corporate venture
"Thornburgh Construction Co. v. College Heights Development, 244 P. 2d 735 (Cal. App. 1952);
D. N. & E. Walter & Co. v. Zuckerman, 214 Cal. 418, 6 P. 2d 251 (i931); Note, 36 YALE L. J. 254.
See Wenban Estate, Inc. v. Hewlett, ig3 Cal. 675, 696f., 227 Pac. 723 (1924); Note, so MINN. L. REv.
598, 607 (1926). Cf. Progress Tailoring Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 153 F. 2d 103 (7th Cir.
1946).
Metropolitan Holding Co. v. Snyder, 79 F. 2d 263, 266 (8th Cir. 1935): "There has been a growing
tendency upon the part of the courts to disregard corporate entity and to treat the stockholders thereof
as an association of individuals when the interests of justice are to be served."
"'For example, see State Trust & Savings Bank v. Hermosa Land & Cattle Co., 3o N. M. 566, 240
Pac. 469 (1925); U. S. Gypsum Co. v. Mackay Wall Plaster Co., 6o Mont. 32, x99 Pac. 249 (1g2).
Indeed, the court may feel moved to disregard corporate personality in order to protect the corporate
shareholders themselves against inequity. Marchman v. McCoy Hotel Operating Co., 21 S. W. 2d 552
(Tex. Civ. App. 1929), 43 HAitv. L. Ryv. 831 (1930). See U. S. Gypsum Co. v. Mackay Wall Plaster
Co., supra note 37, just cited above. Cf. Crystal Pier Amusement Co. v. Cannan, 219 Cal. 184, 25
P. 2d 839 (i933); Application of Field, 190 F. 2d 268 (Ct. of Cus. and Pat. App. 195z).
The simple truth of the matter is that whether the court will sustain or disregard corporate personality
depends upon the policy which the court sponsors in the particular case. Nowhere is this better illustrated
than in the cases involving government owned corporations. In these cases corporate personality is some-
times sustained and sometimes disregarded, depending upon the end result considered judicially desirable
in the given case. For example, contrast: Sloan Shipyards Corporations v. Emergency Fleet Corporation,
258 U. S. 459 (1921); Emergency Fleet Corporation v. Wood, 258 U. S. 549 (i921); United States v.
Walters, 263 U. S. i5 (1923); Clallam County v. United States, 263 U. S. 341 (1923); Southern
Pacific Co. v. Defense Supplies Corp., 64 F. Supp. 6o5 (N. D. Cal. 1946), noted in 20 So. CAL. L. REv.
293 (1947).
Another striking example, concerning one-man companies, is found in two cases decided by the same
court in the same year. These are: Erkenbracher v. Grant, 187 Cal. 7, 200 Pac. 641 (1921), and Minifie
v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 202 Pac. 673 (1921). In both cases the court was obliged to "avoid" the
statute of limitations in order to reach a just result. In the first case, it achieved this result by holding
that the one-man company concerned was an entity disinct from the sole shareholder. In the second
case, it achieved this result by holding that corporate personality should be disregarded and by treating
the sole shareholder and the corporation as one party. Accord: Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Povdin, 14 N. J.
Super. 470, 82 A. 2d 485 (195i).
These and similar miscellaneous cases concerning one-man companies are discussed in Note, One
Man Corporations-Scopc and Limitations, ioo U. OF PA. L. Rav. 853, 865, 866 (1952). Of these
cases the writer says: "It is apparent that each case is being decided on its particular facts. The only
standard is a just and equitable result. It is impossible to formulate a more definite test."
" "In all the experience of the law, there has never been a more prolific breeder of fraud than the
one-man corporation. It is a favorite device for the escape of personal liability." The trial court, as
quoted by Mr. Justice Douglas in Pepper v. Litton, 3o8 U. S. 295, 313, note (1939).
" Note, 45 HAtv. L. Rav. 1084, 1089 (932): "Opposed to the utility of the corporate device, how-
ever, is its peculiar susceptibility to fraudulent use when made available to an individual. The peculiar
opportunity for manipulation of assets and the superior knowledge of the sole shareholder might make
it desirable to require that when he claims limited liability, he must show affirmatively that the corpora-
tion was adequately financed and that its financial identity was kept unimpaired."
"'In re Looschen Piano Case Co., 261 Fed. 93 (D. N. J. 1919), a sole proprietor, engaged in the
business of manufacturing piano cases, formed two one-man companies. To the first he transferred the
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on an adequate financial basis 1
For instance, suppose the business is carried on as if it were the individual
business of the sole shareholder, who makes contracts for the business in his own
name, keeps no individual bank account, and, without separate accounting, places
individual funds and income in the business and draws money from the business for
personal needs at his pleasure. Upon the subsequent insolvency of the business he
will not be permitted to share as a corporate creditor for sums he advanced to the
business as loans. Since he failed to draw a line between his individual and the
corporate affairs, the court refuses to draw the line for him and lets him stand where
he placed himself42 Likewise, under such circumstances the sole shareholder will
be personally liable for obligations incurred in the execution of the business.
43
The same results follow when the corporation is inadequately capitalized. 44
realty, to the second he transferred the good will and remaining assets, of the business. No corporate
formalities were observed, no separate records were maintained for the two companies, the affairs of both
companies were completely "intermingled," and the entire venture was operated, as heretofore, as a sole
proprietorship. Upon the bankruptcy of the second company, the trustee was held entitled to the assets
of the first company, as part of the bankrupt estate. The court curtly observed (p. 97): "The law will
regard two corporations as separate and distinct entities, when they are so regarded and so treated in
their operation by their directors or management."
" Pepper v. Litton, 3o8 U. S. 295, 308-310 (1939): "Thus, salary claims of officers, directors, and
stockholders in the bankruptcy of 'one-man' or family corporations have been disallowed or subordinated
where the courts have been satisfied that allowance of the claims would not be fair or equitable to
other creditors. And that result may be reached even though the salary claim has been reduced to
judgment. . . . It is also reached where on the facts the bankrupt has been used merely as a corporate
pocket of the dominant stockholder, who, with disregard of the substance or form of corporate man-
agement, has treated its affairs as his own. And so-called loans or advances by the dominant
or controlling stockholder will be subordinated to claims of other creditors and thus treated in effect as
capital contributions by the stockholder not only in the foregoing types of situations but also where
the paid-in capital is purely nominal, the capital necessary for the scope and magnitude of the operations
of the company being furnished by the stockholder as a loan." See Re Merrick Dairy Co., 249 Wis.
295, 24 N. W. ad 679 (1946) (salary claims of three dominant shareholder-directors subordinated to
claims of general corporate creditors).
"-Gordon v. Baton Rouge Stores Co., Inc., 168 La. 248, 12, So. 759 (1929). Accord: Re Burntside
Lodge, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 785 (D. Minn. 1934); Edward Finch Co. v. Robie, 12 F. 2d 36o, 362 (8th Cit.
X926): "The corporation and the bankrupt were one and the same. Their affairs were so intermingled
and commingled that no individuality or corporate entity is discernible." See HENRY W. BALLENTINE,
PRIVATE CORORAnONS 294 (2d ed. 1946). Cf. Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Nield, 186 Ky. 17, 23,
216 S. W. 62, 65 (i919), in which the defendant, according to the court, performed the staggering
feat of "swallowing the corporation whole" and thereby became liable for its debts. See Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U. S. 295 (i939).
aWittman v. Whittingham, 85 Cal. App. 140, 259 Pac. 63 (1927); Tynes v. Shore, 185 S. E. 845
(W. Va. X936); Western Securities Co. v. Spiro, 62 Utah 623, 21l Pac. 856 (X923). Cf. Lobby
Display Frame Corp. v. Steinberg, 114 N. Y. S. ad 917, 115 N. Y. S. 2d 859, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 330
(1952).
Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company, 5i HARV. L. REv. X373,
138I (938), argues that the sole shareholder should not be liable merely because he failed "to ob-
serve a nice distinction between his dual capacities." The wisdom of this position is open to question.
He then says that in the decided cases in which the claimant succeeded the sole shareholder was held
personally liable only because of additional features, such as a showing of inadequate corporate capital
or a showing that the claimant was misled. This generalization does not seem warranted by the cases.
"'Arnold v. Phillips, I17 F. 2d 497 (5 th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U. S. 583 (1941); Dixie Coal
Mining Co. v. Williams, 221 Ala. 331, 128 So. 799 (1930) (sole shareholder liable for compensation
benefits to widow of corporate employee killed on the job). Cf. Hanson v. Bradley, 298 Mass. 371,
1o N. E. ad 259 (i937).
Worth noting in this connection is Section 67(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 STAT. 564 (1898), as
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It is eminently proper to require that the shareholder and incorporator must,
as the price for the privilege of corporate personality and limited liability, finance
the enterprise in such fashion as to enable it to meet the normal and expectable
strains of a business of the size and character involved" Failure to honor this
standard will impose upon him personal liability for obligations incurred in the
execution of the business and will preclude his sharing as a creditor for sums ad-
vanced as loans to the business."0
Needless to say, the standard of adequate capital is slippery and difficult to
apply. In recent years it has received much attention, especially in connection with
the problem of subsidiary and affiliated corporations, as will appear below. A recent
case in which the court was concerned with the application of this standard in a
one-man company is Arnold v. Phillips' Here an entrepreneur who wished to
operate a brewery formed a corporation with an authorized share capital of $50,000
and paid cash for the shares. He then advanced $75,ooo as a loan in order to enable
the company to begin business. The venture lost heavily. Two years after in-
corporation he advanced large sums as loans. Upon the subsequent insolvency of
amended, 54 STAT. 835 (1940), i U. S. C. §1o7(d)(2) (1946). This provision declares: "Every
transfer made and every obligation incurred by a debtor within one year prior to the filing of a,
petition in bankruptcy . . . by or against him is fraudulent . . . ; or (b) as to then existing creditors
and as to other persons who became creditors during the continuance of a business or transaction, if
made or incurred without fair consideration by a debtor who is engaged or is about to engage in such
business or transaction, for which the property remaining in his hands is an unreasonably small capital,
without regard to his actual intent; or (c) as to then existing future creditors, if mado or incurred
without fair consideration by a debtor who intends to incur or believes that he will incur debts beyond
his ability to pay as they mature....
A similar provision is found in Section 5 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. 9 U. L. A.
Sec. 5 (X918).
" Fuller, supra note 43, at 1382: "It may not be unreasonable to expect that the requirement v'ith
respect to the relative amount of capital necessary to insure a sole shareholder against personal liability
may be less exacting than when the parent-subsidiary relationship is involved, because the subsidiary
corporation is really seeking a double insulation."
Note, Inadequately Capitalized Subsidiaries, x9 U. op Cm. L. Ruv. 872 n. x (a952): "There appears
to be no reason why a distinction should be made between parent corporations as stockholders and
the stockholder in the 'one-man' corporation in the case of corporations organized with inadequate
capital. However, liability appears to be more frequently limited when the stockholder is not a corporate
entity."
"'Cases cited in note 44, supra. In Hanson v. Bradley, 298 Mass. 371, 380, 381, 5o N. E. 2d 259,
263-264 (1937), the court complained: "The original purpose of laws permitting the formation of
corporations was to enable stockholders to put at the risk of the business capital reasonably adequate for
its needs, and thereby keep free from that risk their uninvested assets and their personal responsibility....
Incorporators have not always been satisfied to take even the limited risk just stated. They have
sought to make available to general creditors, even to tort creditors, only an amount of capital which
is either illusory or trifling compared with the business to be done, while the incorporators advance
the capital really necessary for the business in the capacity of competing creditors, or even in that of
secured creditors. In other words, they seek personal immunity without providing any fund to which
creditors may resort. This is not unusual in the organization of corporations which are subsidiaries or
affiliates of others, but the practice is not confined to them."
47 17 F. 2d 497 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied 33 U. S. 583 (194). The court said (p. 502):
"It is not denied that a corporation, owned by one man save for qualifying shares, is lawful in Texas.
That it was created to shield the owner from liability beyond the capital set up by the charter does
not show an unlawful or fraudulent intent, for that is a main purpose of every incorporation. It becomes
an evidence of fraud only when the capital is unsubstantial and the risk of loss great, or the contributions
to capital are greatly overvalued, and the like."
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the enterprise it was held that the first advance of $75,000 should be treated as a
capital contribution, not recoverable by him, but that the later advances should be
treated as genuine loans, for which he could share as a corporate creditor.48
E. Competing Equities of Personal and Business Creditors
There has been occasion under the preceding headings to mention the respective
positions of the personal creditors and the business creditors. The problem presents
no difficulty when there are no circumstances calling for disregard of corporate per-
sonality. As already observed, the line of demarcation between the business unit
and the shareholder's personal affairs serves to mark the respective positions of the
shareholder, the business creditors, and the personal creditors. The corporate or
business creditor cannot reach the shareholder's individual property; conversely, his
personal creditors cannot reach the corporate property; the shareholder may share
as a corporate creditor for sums loaned to the business; and it is immaterial to those
results that insolvency has overtaken the shareholder, or the corporation, or both.
On the other hand, if there are circumstances calling for disregard of corporate
personality, this problem of the respective positions of the personal and the business
creditors presents great difficulty. Assuming that corporate personality is to be
disregarded, the formal consequence is that "the corporation" vanishes and a sole
proprietorship occupies the entire scene. The particular practical results would be:
(I) the erstwhile sole or principal shareholder will not enjoy limited liability; (2)
he will not be permitted to share as a corporate creditor and will be denied reim-
bursement for "loans" advanced to the business; and (3) all the assets remaining after
secured or lien creditors have exhausted their security will constitute a common fund
for the satisfaction of the unsecured claims held by the business and the personal
creditors alike. There could be no quarrel with the first two results, but the third
result may be open to question. When insolvency has overtaken the business
venture, or the shareholder, or both, the competing equities of the personal and the
business creditors may justify or require a marshaling of assets. It may be proper
or necessary to give the business creditors priority in the business assets, and the
personal creditors priority in the personal assets, or to make some other alignment,
under the particular circumstances.
The point of the matter is that disregard of corporate personality is no open
"s Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U. S. 349, 36x, 362, 363 (1944): "Normally the corporation is an insulator
from liability on claims of creditors. The fact that incorporation was desired in order to obtain limited
liability does not defeat that purpose. . . . But there are occasions when the limited liability sought
to be obtained through the corporation will be qualified or denied. Mr. Justice Cardozo stated that a
surrender of that principle of limited liability would be made 'when the sacrifice is essential to the end
that some accepted public policy may be defended or upheld. . . .' The cases of fraud make up part
of that exception. . . . But they do not exhaust it. An obvious inadequacy of capital, measured by the
nature and magnitude of the corporate undertaking, has frequently been an important factor in cases
denying stockholders their defense of limited liability. . . . That rule has been invoked even in the
absence of a legislative policy which undercapitalization would defeat. It becomes more important in a
situation such as the present one where the statutory policy of double liability will be defeated if
impecunious bank-stock holding companies are allowed to be interposed as non-conductors of liability.
It has often been held that the interposition of a corporation will not be allowed to defeat a legislative
policy, whether that was the aim or only the result of the arrangement."
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sesame of solution.49 In the wake of disregarding corporateness there may be need
of adjustments in order to resolve the conflicting equities of rival claimants. The
lack of authority in these matters may indicate that the full implications of the
problem have not been perceived. A more detailed analysis is found at the close
of the succeeding discussion of the subsidiary corporation. The sentiments expressed
regarding the analogous situation there presented are believed to be pertinent and
controlling here.'
An example which will serve to illustrate one aspect of this problem and to
conclude the discussion is found in those cases where debtors resort to the one-man
company or family corporation as a device to defraud creditors. A financially em-
barrassed merchant who wishes to hinder his creditors will sometimes form a close
corporation, transfer the business to it, take in return all or most of the shares, and
operate the business as a corporate officer at a fixed salary, with the dominion he
enjoyed as a sole proprietor. In cases of this kind the courts disregarded corporate
personality, of course, and permit the defrauded creditors to trace and seize the
assets transferred. ° No one would question this result, standing by itself. However,
consideration must also be given to those persons who have innocently dealt with
and subsequently extended credit to the business on a corporate basis. There is
authority indicating that these subsequent creditors will enjoy priority in the cor-
porate assets over the former creditors whom the incorporator sought to defraud."'
On the other hand, if the former creditors act promptly and through legal action
acquire a lien on the assets transferred to the corporation, before the new corporate
creditors acquire such a lien, the former creditors' prior lien will prevail."' Thus,
the position of the defrauded creditors will depend on the diligence with which they
have followed their debtor's affairs and the timeliness with which they have moved.
The respective equities of the two groups of creditors are adjusted by favoring the
new creditors over the old creditors unless the latter have been active and alert.
The good faith or innocence of a claimant is even more important than his dili-
gence. For example, in the Sampsell case 5 X, a financially embarrassed sole pro-
4 ELviu R. LA-rY, SUBSIDIAMES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONs 7 (z936): ". . . even when the
point of 'disregarding' the entity is once reached, this 'disregard' may leave one only at the threshold
of the solution to the problem under consideration."
"Bennett v. Minott, 28 Ore. 3'39, 39 Pac. 997, 44 Pac. 283 (1896); Kellogg v. Douglas County
Bank, 58 Kan. 43 (1897); First National Bank of Chicago v. Trebein Co., 59 Ohio St. 316, 52 N. E.
834 (1898). In the case last cited the court said (p. 837): 'The corporation was in substance another
F. C. Trebein. His identity as owner of the property was no more changed by his conveyance to the
company that it would have been by taking off one coat and putting on another." In another case
it is said that "such a corporation is a mere parasitic growth, a mass of fungus, which will be lopped
off clean whenever necessary to sound results." Matchan v. Phoenix Land Investment Co., x59 Minn.
132, 138, 198 N. WV. 417, 420 (1924).
"'See Jackson v. N. H. Thomas Investment Co., 46 F. 2d 252 (Sth Cir. x931); Folsom & Co. v.
Detrick Fertilizer Co., 85 Md. 52, 36 Ad. 446 (1897).
Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 3r3 U. S. 215 (1941), takes a different position, though
the decision itself is easily distinguishable on other grounds. Here the corporate creditor knew all
the material facts when his claim arose; indeed, he had helped in the formation of the corporation
and was in effect a party to the fraud.
" Booth v. Bunce, 33 N. Y. 139 (x865).
rsSampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U. S. 215 (940.
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prietor, transferred his assets to a family corporation formed for the purpose of
hindering his creditors. Y extended credit to the corporation with full knowledge
of these facts. Upon the subsequent bankruptcy of X the court ordered the seizure
of the corporate assets as part of X's bankrupt estate. Y contended that in the dis-
tribution of the corporate assets he was entitled to priority over the individual cred-
itors whom X had sought to defraud. Y's claim for priority was denied. This seems
a fair result. Under the circumstances presented the equity of the shareholder's de-
frauded individual creditors was stronger than that of the corporate creditor.
Similarly, in Hanson v. Bradley54 an employee of a one-man company which had
been formed with nominal capital and was insolvent sought to hold the sole share-
holder personally liable for wage claims. The court held the employee could not
succeed, since he was fully aware of all the facts when his claim arose 55
II
The Subsidiary Corporation56
Although the subsidiary corporation has been most extensively used, and has
reached its acme of evolution, in the field of public utilities, it has been widely used
in other areas of commercial endeavor.T Among the many reasons for its adoption
and use are: the desire for greater facility in financing, the avoidance of taxation,
and the elimination of cumbersome management structures.58 A basic factor has
298 Mass. 371, so N. E. 2d 259 (1937).
The shareholder had advanced funds as a loan to the corporation and had taken a lien on the
corporate assets as security for repayment. The employee was also seeking to set aside this lien, but
did not succeed.
In its opinion the court first delivers a general condemnation of arrangements to form corporations
with inadequate capital, and then says (298 Mass. at 382, io N. E. 2d at 264): "The plaintiff was not
wronged by the fact that the corporation was organized with a trifling capital and could not live except
upon borrowed money; nor by the fact that the lenders insisted on security. He knew the essential facts
and accepted the situation."
" ELVIN R. LATTY, SUBSIDIAIS AND AFFILIATED CoRPoRATIoNs (1936); FRzEascK J. POWELL, PARENT
AND SUBSIDIARY CORPOrTIONS (1931).
The provocative study by Latty is now the classic in the field and has become the Mecca of courts
and commentators. Latty makes great sport of the business of lifting and piercing veils and the other
verbal artifices of the courts, which fail to articulate the policy factors that constitute the causal core of
decision. He well recognizes, of course, that the decisional structure erected by the judges is sound and
commendable, despite the verbal shabbiness of its facade. He says (p. 3): "While the decisions have
on the whole been an admirable feat of social engineering, their rationalizations have been in terms of
mechanical formulae which fail when put to the test, and which do not reveal the real dynamic forces
at work."
"
T Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, in Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U. S. 349, 379-380 (X944): "If to
legislate were the province of this Court, we would be at liberty candidly to exercise discretion toward
the undoing of the holding company. Some of us feel that as utilized in this country it is, with a
few exceptions, a menace to responsible management and to sound finance, shifting control of local
institutions to absentee managements and centralizing in few hands control of assets and enterprises
bigger than they are able well to manage--views which are matters of record." See Berle, The De-
veloping Law of Corporate Concentration, ig U. oF Cm. L. REv. 639 (1952).
8 The process of multiple incorporation is used to split up a business into its component parts. For
instance, the enterprise of producing and selling a given item may be divided into the manufacture of
the product and the marketing of the product. Thus, a corporation formed in Ohio for the purpose
of manufacturing and selling tires causes the formation of a subsidiary in Delaware. The parent then
manufactures tires and sells them only to the subsidiary, which in turn markets them to the public.
McLean v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 85 F. 2d 150, 151 (5 th Cir. 1936): "The Ohio
488 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
been the wish to avoid the difficulty or the impossibility of a concern's qualifying as
a foreign corporation in a given state. A corporation formed in one state, and wish-
ing to do business in another state, may find it either convenient" or necessary 0 to
have a subsidiary formed in the latter state for this purpose.
A potent, though not a paramount, motive for the use of the subsidiary corpora-
tion has been the desire for limited liability. An individual who wishes to avoid
the risk of submitting his entire fortune to the vicissitudes of a business may in-
corporate and may, through the limited liability thus attained, dedicate only a por-
tion of his estate to the venture. In the same way, a corporation which wishes to
risk only a portion of its assets in a particular sphere of the business may form a
subsidiary for this purpose and may, through the additional limited liability thus
attained, dedicate only a portion of its assets to that particular segment of the busi-
ness. So, by the process of further incorporation there is obtained further insulation
from liability.
A. The Parent and Subsidiary as Separate Units
Two factors appear as constants in the parent-subsidiary relationship: (I) The
parent corporation owns all, or a majority of, or a controlling interest in the sub-
sidiary's shares. Sometimes the same persons own all, or a majority of, or a con-
trolling interest in the shares of both corporations. (2)Both corporations have com-
mon, or identical, directors and officers.
The presence of these two factors is not of itself sufficient ground for disregard-
ing the separate corporate personalities of the two units. The parent and subsidiary
are treated as separate and distinct persons, pursuant to the legal entity theory, even
though the parent owns all the subsidiary's shares and the two corporations have
identical directors and officers.6 ' In the language of a typical judicial declaration :
corporation had the right to create the subsidiary for the purpose of dividing its business and . . . for
the purpose of its usual business, not involving fraud or infringement upon the rights of third parties,
they are to be considered separate entities." So, a corporation formed for the purpose of manufacturing
rubber products may decide to become a mere holding company and lease its various plantq to A
subsidiary organized for the purpose of operating them. See U. S. Rubber Co. v. Query, i9 Fed. Supp.
191 (D. S. C. 1937).
"For example, suppose a Maine corporation wishes to do business in Alabama and discovers that
the latter bestows on its corporations certain advantages not enjoyed by corporations formed clsewhcre.
In order to reap the benefit of these advantages, the corporation does not enter Alabama as a foreign
corporation, but instead has a subsidiary formed in that state for the purpose of doing local business
there. See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U. S. 333, 335, 336, 337 (1925).
" For example, a Vermont railroad company wishes to join to its line a roadbed lying in Massachu-
setts, but the law of that state requires that railroads in the state must be operated by its own corpora-
tions. The Vermont company thereupon has a subsidiary formed in Massachusetts to operate the roadbed
there. See Central Vermont Ry. v. Southern New England R. R., i Fed. Supp. 1004 (D. Mass. 1932).
Similarly, Mexican law forbids foreign corporations to operate oil wells within fifty kilometers of the
coast. An American corporation wishing to operate free of this restriction simply resorts to the device
of organizing a string of Mexican subsidiaries manned by Mexican officers. See New York Trust Co.
v. Island Oil & Transport Corp., 34 F. 2d 655 (2d Cir. 1929). See also notes 72 and 73, inira.
"' Dabney v. Chase National Bank of City of New York, 98 F. Supp. 807 (S. D. N. Y. 5951). Cf.
Bigelow v. R. K. 0. Radio Pictures, Inc., 17o F. ad 783 (7th Cir. 1949), noted in 33 MAIQ. L. Rev.
123 (949). See Albert v. McGrath, 104 F. Supp. 891, 897 (S. D. Cal. 1952).
"5 Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 77 F. ",d 478, 487 (8th Cir. 1935). For similar language see
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Few questions of law are better settled than that the corporation is ordinarily a wholly
separate entity from its shareholders, whether they be one or more. . . . Likewise we
think it must be conceded that neither ownership of all of the stock of one corporation
by another, nor the identity of officers in one with officers in another, creates a merger of
the two corporations into a single entity, or makes one either the principal or the agent
of the other.
Ownership of shares in a corporation normally carries with it certain rights, such
as the right to vote for directors, to adopt by-laws, to vote on fundamental changes,
and so forth. These rights are, as a matter of verbal convenience, bundled together
under the name-tag of "control." The fact that a parent corporation, in its char-
acter as sole or majority shareholder of the subsidiary, acquires and exercises such
control does not assimilate the two units. After all, this control is merely an inci-
dent of the ownership of shares and is recognized by law as a normal matter of
corporate procedure. A corporate shareholder is entitled, no less than a human
shareholder, to exercise the control which shareholdership carries 3
It is frequently held, in keeping with these principles, that the parent corpora-
don is not liable for the contracts and torts of the subsidiary, even though the
former holds all the latter's shares and the directors and officers of both corporations
are the same. Conversely, the subsidiary is not liable for the contracts and torts
of the parent corporation 5
In the same way, the parent and subsidiary are frequently regarded as separate
units for other legal purposes, such as determining the incidence of taxation66 and
Garden City Co. v. Burden, x86 F. 2d 651, 653 (ioth Cir. 1951); Henderson v. Rounds & Porter
Lumber Co., 99 F. Supp. 376, 381 (W. D. Ark. i95i); Centmont Corp. v. Marsch, 68 F. 2d 460, 463
(ist Cir. 1933); Martin v. Development Co. of America, 240 Fed. 42, 45 (9th Cir. 1917).
"'See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 96 F. 2d 693, 7o6 (xoth Cir. 1938); Greenbaum v.
Lehrenkrauss Corp. 73 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1934); Exchange Bank of Macon v. Macon Construction
Co., 97 Ga. x, 6, 25 S. E. 326, 328 (1895): "It makes no difference in principle whether the sole owner
of the stock of a corporation is a man or another corporation. The corporation owning such stock is
as distinct from the corporation whose stock is so owned as the man is from the corporation of which
he is the sole member."
"Constitution Publishing Co. v. Dale, x64 F. ad 2io (sth Cir. 1947) (tort); Kulukundis v. Dean
Stores Holding Co., Inc., 132 Conn. 685, 47 A. 2d 183 (1946) (rent due on subsidiary's lease); Ohio
Edison Co. v. Warner Coal Corp., 79 Ohio App. 437, 72 N. E. 2d 487 (1946) (contract claim); North
v. The Higbee Co., 131 Ohio 507, 3 N. E. 2d 391 (1936) (rent due on subsidiary's lease); Owl Fumi-
gating Corp. v. California Cyanide Co., 24 F. 2d 718 (D. Del. 1928), afl'd, 30 F. 2d 812 (3rd Cir.
1929) (patent infringement by subsidiary); Majestic Co. v. Orpheum Circuit, Inc., 2i F. 2d 720 (8th
Cir. 1927) (rent due on subsidiary's lease); Pagel, Horton & Co. v. Harmon Paper Co., 236 App. Div.
47, 248 N. Y. Supp. 168 (4 th Dep't 1932) (supplies purchased by subsidiary). See American Cyanamid
Co. v. Wilson & Toomer Fertilizer Co., 51 F. 2d 665 (5 th Cir. 1931); Finley v. Union Joint Stock Land
Bank of Detroit, 281 Mich. 214, 274 N. W. 768 (1937).
"McLean v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 85 F. ad i5o (5th Cir. X936); Kingston Dry Dock
Co. v. Lake Champlain Trans. CO., 3 F. 2d 265 (ad Cir. x929). Cf. The J. B. Austin, Jr., I F. 2d
45' (D. N. Y. 1924). For a discussion of this point see Note, 43 YALE L. J. 472 (1934).
" See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Oxford Paper Co., 194 F. ad 19o (ad Cir. 1952);
Warrior River Terminal Co. v. State, 58 So. ad ioo (Ala. 1952); Rexall Drug Co. v. Peterson, 248
P. 2d 433 (Cal. App. 1952); Commonwealth v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 359 Pa. 583, 6o A. 2d 46 (1948).
Cf. Superior Coal Co. v. Department of Finance, 377 I11. 282, 36 N. E. 2d 354 (1941). In U. S.
Rubber Co. v. Query, 19 F. Supp. 191 (E. D. S. C. 1937), a New Jersey corporation owned various
plants throughout the country, including one in South Carolina. These plants were leased to and
operated by a subsidiary formed for the purpose in Delaware. In deciding that the New Jersey holding
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settling problems of judicial jurisdiction and service of process 7 Likewise, it is held
that a person employed by a subsidiary is not an employree of the parent corpora-
tion.6
8
B. Fusion of Parent and Subsidiary
The rules previously discussed concerning disregard of corporate personality are,
of course, applicable to the parent-subsidiary relation.69 It is clear that corporate
personality will be disregarded, and the two units will be "fused," wherever "the
notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect
fraud, or defend crime."7
company was not doing business in South Carolina and was not subject to a franchise tax imposed by
that state, the court said (p. 194): "Through stock ownership, interlocking directorates and identity of
controlling officers, plaintiff controls the Rubber Products Company. The two corporations occupy the
same offices in New York City, but each maintains its separate corporate identity, the persons who are
officers performing for each corporation the duties pertaining to their offices in that corporation, and trans-
actions between the two corporations being accurately recorded in their corporate books and records."
"
7 For example, a corporation formed in state A has a subsidiary formed in state B for the purpose
of doing local business in state B. The parent corporation is not considered to be doing business in,
and is not subject to suit in, state B. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U. S. 333 (1925);
La Varre v. International Paper CO., 37 F. 2d 141 (D. S. C. 1929); Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v.
Hobgood, 244 Ky. 570, 5I S. W. 2d 920 (1932).
Service of process upon a local subsidiary is not equivalent to service of process upon the foreign
parent. Steinway v. Majestic Music Co., 179 F. 2d 681 (soth Cir. 1949). See Mas v. Nu-Grape Co. of
America, 62 F. 2d 113 (4th Cir. 1932). The problem is discussed in Note, 45 ILL. L. Ray. 291 (1950).
The result is otherwise if the subsidiary is a mere "agency" or "instrumentality" of the parent. In
that event, the business done in the state by the subsidiary is held to render the parent present in the
state and to subject it to suit there. Society Milion Athena v. National Bank of Greece, 166 Misc. i9o,
2 N. Y. Supp. 2d r55 (1937), aff'd, 253 App. Div. 650, 3 N. Y. 2d 677 (ist Dep't 1938). See also
Industrial Research Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 29 F. 2d 632 (D. Ohio 1928); Williams v. Freeport
Sulphur Co., 40 S. 'W. 2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), 30 MxcH. L. REV. 464 (1932).
" Wheeler v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 112 Conn. 510, 153 Ad. 159 (93). Accord: Press
Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, i18 F. 2d 937 (D. C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 353
U. S. 595 (94i). Cf. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, x2o F. 2d 641 (D. C.
Cir. 1941).
" Indeed, the leading American decision concerning disregard of corporate personality was precisely
one involving a parent corporation and its subsidiary. United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit
Co., 142 Fed. 247 (D. Wis. 19o5). Here it was found that a brewing company had formed a subsidiary
transit company in order to obtain shipping rebates from railroads, in violation of federal law, and the
federal government's request for an injunction breaking up the practice was granted. Accord: Federal
Gravel Co. v. Detroit & Machinac Railway, 248 Mich. 49, 226 N. W. 677 (X929).
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Faris, 166 Tenn. 238, 244, 6o S. W. 2d 425, 426-427 (1933). "No
principle of law is better settled than that which holds that where a corporation resorts to the subterfuge
of creating a 'dummy' corporation to be used as its agency or instrumentality, for the purpose of avoiding
liability or furthering its illegal designs, they will be treated as one and the same."
Dabney v. Chase National Bank of City of New York, 98 F. Supp. 807, 837 (S. D. N. Y. 1951):
"The law with respect to ignoring the corporate fiction is clear in its insistence upon factors indicating
such a unity of relationship among formally independent corporate entities that an adherence to the
principle of separate existence would work a fraud or other injustice."
A special aspect of this problem is discussed in Note, Disregarding Separate Corporate Entities to
Preserve an Integrated Economic Structure, 47 Cot. L. REv. 109 (947).
" See note 33, supra. In Rippel v. Kaplus, 124 N. J. Eq. 303, 1 A. 2d 883 (Ch. 1938), confirma-
tion of a mortgage foreclosure sale was opposed by the mortgagor, a corporation, on the ground that the
latter was a helpless and penniless debtor unable to protect itself by bidding at the sale. All the shares
ot the mortgagor were owned by another corporation, and there was nothing to shoit that the latter
was financially unable to satisfy the mortgage. The court confirmed the sale and remarked (124 N. J.
Eq. at 305, i A. 2d at 884): "This is a case in which the corporate entity of the obligor should be dis-
regarded; it is not an appeal ot a distressed and helpless debtor." See Seymour v. Woodstock & Sycamore
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This brief statment will serve as sufficient preface to two particular problems in
which disregard of corporate personality has special significance in the parent-sub-
sidiary pattern.
The first of these concerns the subsidiary which is formed in order to overcome
a legal restriction imposed by a given jurisdiction. The legislature of a state will
sometimes declare that certain activities (such as operating a railroad, drilling oil
wells, acquiring land by eminent domain) may be carried on within the state only
by its own domestic corporations.71 A foreign corporation wishing to engage in
these activities in that state will simply resort to the practice of organizing a sub-
sidiary in that state for this purpose. There is a striking Arkansas decision holding
that this practice is not successfully impeachable as an evasion and that the parent
corporation is entitled to retain the advantage thus sought and secured.72 There is
also authority to the contrary.P3
No doubt the result in a given case will depend on the nature and purpose of,
and the judicial attitude towards, the restriction in question. The local courts may
consider the restriction relatively trifling or parochial; on the other hand, they may
consider it one which serves a desirable policy. It would be an easy matter for the
court to sanction the parent's conduct in the first case, and to condemn the parent
corporation for evasion in the second case. The "well established" theory of corporate
entity will serve as the rationalizing peg in the first case, and the equally "well
Traction Co., 281 Ill. 84, 117 N. E. 729 (i917), 31 H.ttv. L. REv. 894 (1918). In Rapid Transit
Subway Construction Co. v. City of New York, 259 N. Y. 472, 182 N. E. 145 (1932), the plaintiff, a
corporation, sued the City of New York to recover damages for breach of contract. It was shown that
the breach was attributable to the conduct of another corporation which owned all the shares of the
plaintiff. The court denied recovery and said (259 N. Y. at 491, 182 N. I. at 15i): "Exemption from
liability for wrong committed by the corporation whose stock it owns is inherent in the privilege, accorded
to it by law, of conducting its business in corporate form: exemption from the consequences of its own
acts working injustice upon parties with which it deals is a perversion of that privilege."
"' See note 6o, supra, and notes 72 and 73, infra.
" Patterson Orchard Co. v. Southwest Arkansas Utilities Corp., 179 Ark. 1029, 18 S. W. 2d io28
(1929): A corporation was formed in Arkansas, took land by eminent domain there, and leased the
land to a Delaware corporation. The Arkansas company was formed as a subsidiary of the Delaware
company in order to acquire the land, since the constitution of Arkansas denied foreign corporations the
privilege of eminent domain and rendered the Delaware company powerless to obtain the land for
itself directly. The court upheld the transaction, over the objection of the party whose land had been
thus condemned and acquired. The court (p. 1032) conceded that "There are, perhaps, some unusual
circumstances connnected with this case," but concluded that the contestant had not been "defrauded in
any way" and that the Delaware company had merely resorted to a proper legal device to obtain the
right-of-way which it thought necessary for the conduct of its business and which it had been unable
to obtain by any other method from the appellant." See Irvine Co. v. Bond, 74 Fed. 849 (S. D. Cal.
1896).
1
'State v. Safford, X17 Ohio 576, 582, 159 N. . 829, 830-831 (1927): "The principle of denying
the right to do by indirection what cannot be done by direct method is thus clearly recognized. If a
non-resident insurance company cannot write insurance in Ohio without a resident license, how can
this desired result be acquired by coming into the state in the guise of an owner of a controlling
interest in a domestic corporation, thus seeking to circumvent the statute relative to resident licenses?"
Cf. New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transport Co., 34 F. 2d 655 (ad Cir. 1929); Central Vermont
Ry. v. Southern New England R. R., i Fed. Supp. 1004 (D. Mass. 1932); General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Commissioner of Banks, 258 Wis. 56, 45 N. W. 2d 83 (1950), noted in 5 VANs. L. Biv. 637
(1952).
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established" rule for disregarding corporate personality will serve to justify the de-
cision in the second case.
Much more important for present purposes is the second particular problem men-
tioned above. This problem is the matter of the legal and financial criteria which
are to govern the operations of a parent corporation and its subsidiary.
The activities of a parent corporation and its subsidiary should conform to the
following four standards: (i) Adequate financing of the subsidiary as a separate
unit. The subsidiary should be established as a separate unit sufficiently financed
to meet the normal obligations and usual strains expectable in a business of its size
and character. (2) Sedulous avoidance of intermingling. The business transactions
of the two units should be kept distinct; separate accounts and records should be
maintained. (3) Careful observance of the formalities of separate corporate pro-
cedures. The formal distinction between the two boards of directors and two sets
of officers should be honored, even though the directors and officers of both corpora-
tions are the same persons; the formalities of separate corporate action, such as the
ritual of separate meetings, should be fully observed and the dual capacities of the
directors and officers thus kept defined. (4) Avoidance of representations blurring
the division between the two units. The two units should not be held out to the
public as being merely one.74
When these standards are observed, a parent and its subsidiary will normally be
treated as separate entities, and the obligations and liabilities of the one will be kept
distinct from those of the other, in accordance with the principles already discussed.
A failure to honor one or more of these requirements may be fatal. The court may
disregard corporate personality and consider the parent and subsidiary "assimilated"
for legal purposes.75 Consequently, liability may be imposed on the parent for con-
tracts and torts of the subsidiary.7"
Three well known cases which supply illustrative contour to the problem may be
briefly considered.
The first case is Luckenbach S. S. Co., Inc. u. W. R. Grace & Co.,77 decided in
192o by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Here a corpora-
tion capitalized at Z8ooooo rented its fleet of steamers to a subsidiary, capitalized at
$io,ooo, for the purpose of operating the vessels. Both corporations had the same
officers and 90 per cent of the shares in each corporation were held by the person
who was president and general manager of both units. The parent was held liable
for a breach of contract by the subsidiary, since "it would be unconscionable to allow
the owner of this fleet of steamers, worth millions of dollars, to escape liability be-
"'This analysis is made in Douglas and Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary
Corporaions, 39 Y- L. J. 193, x96 ff. (1929).
"
5 Fish v. East, 114 F. 2d 177 (ioth Cit. 1940); Pacific Can Co. v. Hewes, 95 F. 2d 42 (9th Cir.
1938); Herman v. Mobile Homes Corp., 317 Mich. 233, 26 N. W. 2d 757 (r947).
7 Cases cited in the following six notes. Other consequences which ensue upon assimilation of the
two units are discussed under subsequent headings in the text. See also note 67, supra.
7267 Fed. 676 (4 th Cir. 1920).
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cause it had turned them over a year before to a $io,ooo corporation which is simply
itself in another form. s
The second case is Ross v. Pennsylvania R. R.' 9 decided in i93o by the New
Jersey courts. Here a person was struck and killed in New Jersey by a negligently
operated train of West Jersey & Seashore Railroad Company, which employed and
paid the wages of the engineers and the other members of the train crew. This
company was a subsidiary of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. The name
"West Jersey and Seashore R. R. Co.," formerly on the fenders of the locomotive, had
been removed and the word "Pennsylvania" substituted; the word "Pennsylvania'
appeared on the coaches of the train; the letters "P. R. R." appeared on the uniforms
of some of the crew; a time table captioned "Pennsylvania Railroad System" listed
the train on the schedules therein contained. The decedent's administrator wrote
two letters concerning the accident to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and the
latter's district claim agent answered both on the merits. In a suit by the admin-
istrator to recover damages from the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, the lower
court submitted to the jury the issue whether that company was controlling and
operating the train at the time of the accident. The jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiff, and the lower court entered judgment on the verdict. On appeal it was
held proper to submit the issue to the jury and the judgment was affirmed 8 °
The third case is Costan v. Manila Electric Co.." decided in 1928 by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Here Manila Electric Company held
title to and operated a street railway in Manila. All its shares, excepting those neces-
sary to qualify directors, were held by Manila Electric Corporation. The directors
of the latter, acting through a committee, appointed a party to act as manager of the
Manila property and conferred upon him broad powers (hiring of employees, pur-
chase of supplies, and so forth), subject to "such general supervision and control
as may be exercised by the directors" of the parent company. This manager was
to receive $25,ooo for his services-$5,ooo from the parent, $20,000 from the subsidi-
ary. While this arrangement prevailed, a person was injured by the negligent
operation of a car on the Manila Street Railway. He sued the holding company for
damages. It was held that the lower court committed reversible error in entering a
compulsory nonsuit. Liability may be fixed on the parent corporation because by
an obtrusive act of intervention it entrusted complete control over the subsidiary's
property to a third party who was subject only to the will of the parent's directorate.
78 267 Fed. at 68x. Accord: Wallace v. Tulsa Yellow Cab Taxi & Baggage Co., 61 P. 2d 645 (Okla.
1936); Garden City Co. v. Burden, x86 F. 2d 65i (ioth Cir. 1951) (tort claim based on subsidiary's negli-
gent operation of an irrigation canal); Henderson v. Rounds & Porter Lumber Co., 99 F. Supp. 376 (W.
D. Ark. i951) (contract claim). See Herman v. Mobile Homes Corp., 317 Mich. 233, 26 N. W. 2d 757
(1947) (contract claim).
79 io6 N. J. L. 536, 148 Ati. 741 (X930), 43 HAuv. L. REv. 1154 (1930).
"°Accord: Mangan v. Terminal Transportation System, Inc., 157 Misc. 627, 284 N. Y. Supp. 183
(Sup. Ct. X935). See Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corporation, 127 F. 2d 344 (2d Cir. 1942); Davis v.
Alexander, 269 U. S. 114, 117 (1925). Cf. Berkley v. Third Avenue Railway, 244 N. Y. 84, 155 N. E. 58
(r926); Bergenthal v. State Garage & Trucking Co., 179 Wis. 42, 19o N. NV. 9o (1922).
81 24 F. 2d 383 (2d Cir. 5928).
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And the subsidiary, without part in the plan, is saddled with an obligation of
$20,000 to boot02
The Costan case indicates that the result in a given situation may turn on formal
aspects of "control." The parent corporation's control, exercised as a normal legal
incident of shareholdership and through the usual rituals of discrete corporate pro-
cedures, is one thing. Dominion exercised by the parent over the subsidiary's affairs
in a "direct" or "obtrusive" manner is another thing. The former is judicially
sanctioned, with the consequence that the separate corporate personality of each unit
is sustained. The latter is judicially condemned, with the consequence that corporate
personality will be disregarded and the two units will be assimilated.
Justice Learned Hand, incomparable for his sense of the practical in litigation,
has neatly capped the matter in these words :
Control through the ownership of shares does not fuse the corporations, even when
the directors are common to each. One corporation may, however, become an actor in
a given transaction, or in part of a business, or in a whole business, and, when it has,
will be legally responsible. To become so, it must take immediate direction of the trans-
action through its officers, by whom alone it can act at all. . . . liability normally must
depend upon the parent's direct intervention in the transaction, ignoring the subsidiary's
paraphernalia of incorporation, directors, and officers. The test is, therefore, rather in the
form than in the substance of the control, in whether it is exercised immediately, or by
means of a board of directors and officers, left to their own initiative and responsibility in
respect of each transaction as it arises. Some such line must obviously be drawn, if share-
holding alone does not fuse the corporations in every case.
In concluding this discussion of the four standards which should govern in-
tercorporate behavior special mention must be made of the matter of adequate
8" The court said (PP. 384-385): "The manager's actions are made subject only to such general
supervision as may be exercised by the directors of the holding company, not of the subsidiaries whose
properties are to be operated. In short, the holding company utterly disregards the Manila Electric
Company as a distinct corporate entity, except perhaps for bookkeeping purposes, and deals with its
properties and their operation as a street railway exactly as though the legal title were in the holding
company."
Accord: McCarthy v. Ference, 358 Pa. 485, 58 A. 2d 49 (1948) (tort claim based on subsidiary's
negligent maintenance of property). Here the court said (358 Pa. at 489, 58 A. 2d at 56): "It appears
that at all times the Steel Corporation treated the Land Company as nothing more than a department of
its own business; indeed it showed its complete disregard of any autonomy on the part of the Land
Company by ignoring it entirely in the contracts which it entered into with the Railroad Company and
the County; the Land Company had nothing whatever to do with the entire project, nor did it enter
as an independent body into any of the negotiations or plans connected therewith."
Consolidated Rock Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U. S. 510, 523-524 (94): "All management functions of
the several companies were assumed by Consolidated. The subsidiaries abdicated. Consolidated operated
them as mere departments of its own business. Not even the formalities of separate corporate organiza-
tions were observed except in minor particulars such as the maintenance of certain separate accounts.
In view of these facts, Consolidated is in no position to claim that its assets are insulated from such
claims of creditors of the subsidiaries. To the contrary, it is well settled that where a holding company
directly intervenes in the management of its subsidiaries so as to treat them as mere departments of its
own enterprise, it is responsible for the obligations of those subsidiaries incurred or arising during its
management .... A holding company which assumes to treat the properties of its subsidiaries as its own
cannot take the benefits of direct management without the burdens."
"' Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F. 2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1929). See
Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 96 F. 2d 693, 7o6 (ioth Cir. 1938).
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capitalization. This standard is by all odds the most important of the four, and
doubtless the most elusive. It impresses the courts and weighs heavily in the
judicial balance s 4 In recent years it has received increasing attention from the
courts and writers s' Cases concerning the problem may be grouped, for convenience
and merely as an aid to discussion, into three loose categories:
(i) Cases in which the subsidiary is formed with a nominal or trifling capital.
Here it is common to find that the subsidiary, at the very start of its existence, has
few or no assets and requires financial support for its operations. It lacks even a
"minimal credit or cushion."
(2) Cases in which the subsidiary is formed with capital which is more than
nominal, but which is insufficient to meet the expectable strains of a business of its
size and nature.
(3) Those cases which fall under either of the first two categories and, in
addition, reveal a plan to milk the subsidiary for the parent's benefit.
Cases of the first category have been easy to decide. An example is a recent case
in which the subsidiary, formed to engage in the business of building homes on a
large scale, was capitalized at $5ooo and immediately embarked on a project re-
quiring a credit of $i,ooo,ooofs
Cases of the third category have also been easy to decide. A recent example is
found in Henderson v. Rounds & Porter Lumber Co! 7  Here a subsidiary was
created to manufacture lumber products. It sold these items below market price to
the parent. The constant operating loss which resulted led to bankruptcy, even
though the parent made several advances (as secured loans) to the subsidiary. The
court found that the capital with which the subsidiary started ($3oooo and ma-
chinery) was sufficient for normal operations and that, in the absence of the milking
by the parent, the subsidiary could have prospered, because of the great demand and
high prices in the lumber products market at the time. The court concluded that
under the circumstances the subsidiary should be regarded as "undercapitalized from
"' Douglas and Shanks, Insulation From Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L. J.
193, 214 (1929): . . . courts are more impressed by an obvious inadequacy of capital on the part of
the subsidiary than they are by the presence of any of the other indicia of identity between the corpora-
tions. . . . In fact, sufficient capital and adequate financial arrangements or the lack of it, insofar as
the various factors motivating the courts are capable of ascertainment from the cases, in some instances
seems to be largely determinative."
" See ELviN R. LA-r?, SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 110-141 (1936); Rembar, Claims
4gainst 4ffiliated Companies in Reorganization, 39 COL. L. REv. 907, 915ff. (i939); Krotinger, The
Deep Rook Doctrine: 4 Realistic Approach to Parent-Subsidiary Law, 42 COL. L. REv. 1124, ii29gf.
(1942). A well considered recent discussion, brief and to the point, is found in Note, Inadequately
Capitalized Subsidiaries, 19 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 872 (1952).
" Herman v. Mobile Homes Corp., 317 Mich. 233, 26 N. W. 2d 757 (1947) (parent held liable
for subsidiary's contractual obligations). See also the Wallace and Garden City cases, both cited in note
78 supra. In contrast, consider the case of Ohio Edison Co. v. Warner Coal Corp., 79 Ohio App. 437,
72 N. E. 2d 487 (946), in which the court, holding that the parent was not liable for the subsidiary's
debt, said of the subsidiary (79 Ohio App. at 439, 72 N. E. 2d at 488): "It operated the business of
mining the coal and had a substantial capital reasonably regarded as adequate to enable it to operate
its business and pay its debts as they matured. Various unforeseen economic factors intervened to defeat
the expectation."
87 99 F. Supp. 376 (W. D. Ark. 195).
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the start." Accordingly, the parent was held liable to the subsidiary's creditors s
The Luckenbach case, already considered above, may be regarded as a decision
falling within the second category. That case seems clear on its facts and was ap-
parently easy to decide. It is obvious, however, that the problem of determining
adequacy of capitalization in cases of the second category may present great diffi-
culty.
The matter of adequate versus inadequate capitalization arises frequently in
cases where the parent seeks to share as a creditor for advances made to the sub-
sidiary. These cases present the question whether the parent's advances are to be
treated as genuine loans, for which the parent may share as a creditor of the sub-
sidiary, or merely as contributions to the subsidiary's capital, for which the parent's
claim must be subordinated to the claims of the subsidiary's creditors."0 Various
tests have been suggested as aids to the determination of this question 0  A prin-
cipal feature of these tests is this: The parent may not deal with the subsidiary on
terms more favorable than those under which an outsider would deal with the
subsidiary." Advantages obtained by the parent in violation of this standard will
be disregarded.
The simple truth is that the courts, obliged by the nature of the problem to treat
each case on its merits, have been feeling their way step by step-not without resort
to hindsight. Rigid rules and fixed formulas are futile in this area of hazy equities
and judicial retrospections. 2 Although this spells disappointment for those who
crave certainty, judicial achievement in this difficult area is impressive and com-
mendableP3
.. The court, speaking of its power to disregard corporate personality and to hold the parent
liable for the subsidiary's debts, said that there are various "negative rules" on the subject, and con-
tinued (p. 381): "It is impossible to formulate a general rule applicable to all cases, and the courts
have not attempted to do so. Rather the over all picture as it appears from the facts dictates whether
or not the power should be exercised."
" Inadequate capitalization is an important factor in the application of the Deep Rock doctrine. A
discussion of that doctrine is found in note 104, infra.
90 See Boyum v. Johnson, 127 F. 2d 491 (8th Cir. 1942), and dissent in Barlow v. Budge, 127 F. 2d
440 (8th Cir. X942). See also the next note.
Rembar, supra, at 915 f., suggests three tests: (i) A comparison of the subsidiary's capital with the
capital of other corporations similar in size and nature. All the parent's advances which bring the
subsidiary's assets up to this level are to be regarded as capital contributions. (2) The extent to which
the subsidiary could have borrowed from outside sources. The parent's advances are to be regarded as
capital contributions if made when the subsidiary could not have borrowed from outside sources. (3)
The ratio between the parent's capital contributions and non-capital contributions. The latter must
not be too great as contrasted with the former.
0 lsraels, The Implications and Limitations of the Deep Roek Doctrine, 42 COL. L Rev. 376, 391
(1942). He suggests that if there is a market for new shares, common or preferred, in the subsidiary,
the parent must invest on that basis. The parent's advances made under such circumstances should
be treated as capital contributions, not loans. "Perhaps only upon a showing that there was no market
for common or preferred stock on reasonable terms would the parent be justified in lending money."
Note, Inadequately Capitalized Subsidiaries, 19 If. OF Cm. L. REv. 872, 874 (1952), speaking of the
line between "legitimate debt and disguised capital," says: "One index is the extent to which con-
tinued long term borrowing from the parent occurs when the subsidiary could not have borrowed
from outsiders."
0. See note 88, supra. It is to be observed, also, that hindsight is to be applied with caution and
circumspection. See note 86, supra.
"
1 Note, Inadequately Capitalized Subsidiaries, 19 U. oF Cu. L. REv. 872, 875 (1952): "While
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C. Legal Metaphors and Practical Realities
The orthodox judicial analysis of the parent-subsidiary relationship differs from
that advanced under the preceding heading. As is to be expected, the courts resort
to words of art. Their approach is this: If the subsidiary is a mere adjunct or in-
strumentality of the parent, the latter will be liable for the former's contracts and
torts. 4 Frequent use is also made of the following words to denote synonymy to
"adjunct" and "instrumentality": agency, alter ego, tool, department, conduit, double,
alias, dummy, and so forth.
These words are not helpful, for they themselves need defining. Obviously,
they are not incantations which produce results by the magic of utterance, but
rather are verbal labels of convenience attached to results which are reached on the
facts of the case. On the basis of given facts it may be felt that the parent corpora-
tion should be held liable for the contract or tort of its subsidiary. It is, of course,
these facts and the decision reached which are significantY5 To say that the parent
subsequent activity indicates what was necessary in the beginning, the courts are faced with an over-
whelming problem. Because quantitative criteria are often artificial and unjust, courts cannot be con-
demned for vaguely phrasing the variables contributing to their decisions. While incorporators have
no yardstick with which to measure their transactions, they have been put on notice that the protection
of their own funds is not enough, and theirs is the responsibility of creating a financial structure which
will not unduly jeopardize creditors in the event of the subsidiary's insolvency."
04 Atwater & Co. v. Fall River Pocahontas Collieries Co., i'9 W. Va. 549, 559, 195 S. E. 99, 104
(1937): "The instrumentality rule is a modern innovation in the law of corporations. It came into
being as a result of a gradual growth, brought about by the necessities of situations which confronted
the courts. The development of the law on this question is still in progress, and therefore courts should
invoke the rule only with mature consideration and caution. Undue haste in the application of the
rule to every case involving corporations would break down the entire corporation law of the country
and would bring about disastrous results."
For analysis and criticism of the "instrumentality rule" see May Department Stores Co. v. Union
Electric Light & Power Co., 107 S. W. 2d 41, 53 f. (Mo. 1937); Note, 21 ST. Louis L. REV. 234
(936).
" "Each case must be regarded as sui generis," it is said, and "slight shading of the facts creates
possible distinctions." Pagel, Horton & Co. v. Harmon Paper Co., 236 App. Div. 47, 49, 258 N. Y.
Supp. z68, 17X (4 th Dep't X932). For similar language see Herman v. Mobile Homes Corp., 317 Mich.
233, 243, 26 N. W. 2d 757 (1947).
Care must be taken in noting and defining the particular issue presented by a case. Whether the
parent is liable for the obligations of the subsidiary is one question. This question may itself turn
on the nature of the obligation involved; conceivably, tort claimants and contract creditors might be
treated differently for this purpose, though the courts have not addressed themselves to this difference.
Whether the parent may share as a creditor for advances made to the subsidiary is another question.
Whether the subsidiary's presence in a state is equivalent to the parent's presence there, in determining
matters respecting jurisdiction and service of process, and whether the units are to be regarded as separate
parties in determining the incidence of taxation under a particular statute, are still other problems. These
and various other classes of issues which arise may be controlled by varying legal policies. For instance, in
Centmont Corp. v. Marsch, 68 F. 2d 460 (ist Cir. X933), cert. denied, 291 U. S. 68o (i934), the parent
was not permitted to share as a creditor for advances made to the subsidiary. But in another case, involv-
ing the same parent and subsidiary, a creditor of the subsidiary was denied recovery against the parent.
Marsch v. Southern New England R. R., 230 Mass. 483, i2o N. E. 12o (19x8). The same dichotomy
appears in the following pair of cases: Re Otsego Waxed Paper Co., X4 F. Supp. 15 (S. D. Mich. 1935)
(parent's claim against subsidiary subordinated to claims of subsidiary's creditors), and Madden v. Mac
Sim Bar Paper Co., 103 F. 2d 974 (6th Cir. 1939) (creditor of subsidiary denied recovery against the
parent).
For examples of judicial sensitivity to this matter see the statements of Justice Brandeis and Judge
Learned Hand in Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U. S. 333, 337 (i925), and New
York Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transport Corp., 34 F. 2d 655 (2d Cir. 1929).
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is liable in this situation because the subsidiary is a mere adjunct or instrumentality
of the parent adds no substance and gives no real reason for the decision, but merely
supplies verbal justification and a metaphorical tag to the conclusion which is predi-
cated on the facts. Beneath the verbal coating dynamic forces are at play-the un-
expressed factors of legal policy which constitute the real reason for decision. As
Justice Cardozo, whose devotion to picturesque speech is well known, deftly
declared: "The whole problem of the relation between parent and subsidiary corpora-
tions is one that is still involved in the mists of metaphor. Metaphors in law are
to be carefully watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they often end by
enslaving it.""7
Assuming that the usual judicial analysis is to be followed, the basic question re-
mains: What circumstances will justify calling the subsidiary a mere adjunct or in-
strumentality of the parent? In the usual case it is a failure to honor one or more
of the four standards of behavior, described above, which is the operative fact
causing the subsidiary to be considered a mere adjunct of the parent. Hence, the
favorite form of judicial statement, pinned down to the cases and their factual con-
tent, reduces to this: Ownership by the parent of all the subsidiary's shares, and the
presence of common or identical directors and officers, are not of themselves sufficient
cause to render the subsidiary an adjunct of the parent or to assimilate the units; on
the other hand, a failure to honor one or more of the four standards which should
characterize the activities of a parent and its subsidiary may be sufficient cause to
render the subsidiary an adjunct of the parent and to assimilate the units.""
D. The Parent as Creditor of the Subsidiary
A parent corporation is not permitted, upon the insolvency of a subsidiary which
is a mere "adjunct," to share as creditor for sums advanced as loans to the subsidi-
ary." Conversely, the claim of the subsidiary against its insolvent parent is also
ROBERT S. STEVENS, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 85 (2d ed. 1949): "Whether a distinction between
these personalities will be made may vary with the nature of the action in which the issue is raised, and
cannot be determined in one action for all purposes."
o' Taylor v. Standard Gas Co., 3o6 U. S. 307, 322 (1939) The "so-called instrumentality rule,"
said the Court, "is not, properly speaking, a rule, but a convenient way of designating the application in
particular circumstances of the broader equitable principle that the doctrine of corporate entity, recog-
nized generally and for most purposes, will not be regarded when so to do would work fraud or
injustice."
;' Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway, 244 N. Y. 84, 94, 155 N. E. 58, 6r (1926). See also Kingston
Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transport Co., 3r F. 2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1921); Re Pittsburgh
Railways Co., 155 F. 2d 477, 484 (3rd Cir. 1946); 22 BOsTON U. L. REv. 127 (1942).98 See Douglas and Shanks, Insulation From Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.
J. 193, 195 (1929); FREDERICK J. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 9 et seq. (1931);
Note, 46 HAiv. L. R~v. 823 (1933).
99 Henry v. DoIley, 99 F. 2d 94 (ioth Cir. 1938); Re Otsego Waxed Paper Co., 14 Fed. Supp. 15
(D. Mich. i935); Central Vermont Ry v. Southern New England R. R., x Fed. Supp. 1004 (D. Mass.
1932); Centmont Corp. v. Marsch, 68 F. ad 460 (ist Cir. 1933); S. 0. V. Co. v. S. G. V. Co., 264 Pa.
265, 107 Ad. 721 (i919); Clere Clothing Co. v. Union Trust & Savings Bank, 224 Fed. 363 (gth Cir.
1915).
"The reason is that the proprietor of a business cannot lend money to the enterprise and thus curtail
the rights of creditors by sharing in pari passu with them, and such loan is regarded as a contribution
to the capital of the business." New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transport Co., 56 F. 2d 580, 583
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rejected.'0°
These are sound results based on the desire to protect the creditors of the two
units. In the first situation the insolvent subsidiary's creditors are protected against
further depletion of the assets available for the payment of their claims; in the
second situation, the insolvent parent's creditors are protected against further deple-
tion of the assets available for the payment of their claims.
In the cases which reject1° ' the parent corporation's claim against the insolvent
subsidiary there are present facts-such as "intermingling," failure to observe the
formalities of separate corporate action, inadequate financing of the subsidiary as a
separate unit-which justify calling the subsidiary a mere adjunct of the parent.
Whether the same result would follow in the absence of such facts is open to ques-
tion. The desire to protect the subsidiary's creditors may, conceivably, be in itself
sufficient ground to induce a court to treat the subsidiary as a mere adjunct of the
parent and to reject the parent's claim.' In the case of the one-man company it is
held, as already seen, that the sole shareholder who keeps his individual affairs dis-
tinct from the corporate venture may lend money to the business and share as a credi-
tor upon its insolvency. There appears to be no logical or practical reason why the
corporate shareholder in the parent-subsidiary pattern should be treated differently
in this respect from the human shareholder in the one-man company. Therefore,
a parent corporation which has honored the four standards that should characterize
the activities of parent and subsidiary units may, it is believed, share as a creditor
for its loans to the subsidiary, upon the latter's insolvency. The available cases on
the point are to this effect. 10
3
Cases in which the parent seeks to share as a creditor for its advances to the
subsidiary frequently raise two particular problems.
(2d Cir. 1932).
Allowance of the parent's claim would be "tantamount to allowing a debtor to prove in bankruptcy in
competition with its own creditors, a result which shocks the conscience of a chancellor." Central
Vermont Ry. v. Southern New England R. R., cited above, supra at 1005.
100 New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transport Co., 34 F. 2d 655 (2d Cir. 1929).
101 If the parent's claim against the insolvent subsidiary is subordinated to the claims of the subsidiary's
other creditors, the latter will exhaust the subsidiary's assets and leave nothing for the parent, in the
usual case. Hence, in these situations subordinating the parent's claim is, for all practical purposes,
equivalent to disallowing it. See Note, 47 COL. L. Rav. 8oo, 804 n. 38 (1947).
Furthermore, when courts wish to disregard corporate personality and to assimilate the units, they
do so on the premise that the subsidiary is a mere adjunct or instrumentality of the parent. Under this
approach the parent cannot be considered a creditor of the subsidiary, since a party cannot assert a claim
as creditor against himself. Accordingly it would be more appropriate to speak of disallowing the
claim, rather than of subordinating it, in these cases.
In view of these considerations it is not surprising to find that almost all the cases dealing with
these matters speak of disallowance or rejection, rather than of subordination.
See Note, Subordination of a Parent's Claim Against a Subsidiary, 36 ILL. L. REV. 229, 230, 232
(1941).
102 See Note, 46 HAsv. L. Rav. 823, 828 (1933).
...See Re Watertown Paper Co., x69 Fed. 252 (2d Cir. 29o9); Finn v. George T. Mickle Lumber
Co., 41 F. 2d 676 (gth Cir. 1930); Franklin Process Co. v. Western Franklin Process Co., 308 Ill. App.
302, 31 N. E. 2d 364 (194); Note, 37 MiCH. L. R~v. 440 (1939); Note, 45 YALE L. J. 1471 (1936).
Cf. Forbush Co. v. Bartley, 78 F. 2d 805 (ioth Cir. 1935) (parent's claim denied because based on
fraudulent and forged entries).
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The first is the problem of adequate capitalization of the subsidiary. Here the
question arises whether the advances made to the subsidiary are to be regarded as
genuine loans, for which the parent may share as a creditor of the subsidiary, or
merely as contributions to the subsidiary's capital, for which the parent's claim must
be subordinated to the claims of the subsidiary's creditors. This matter was touched
upon above when the question of adequate capitalization of the subsidiary was
under discussion.
The second problem concerns the legal incidents which ensue when insolvency
has overtaken both the parent and its "adjunct" subsidiary. Here, if the parent's
claim is denied, or is subordinated to the claims of the subsidiary's creditors, the
latter will benefit at the expense of the parent's creditors. If the parent's claim is
allowed, without subordination, its creditors will benefit at the expense of the
subsidiary's creditors. The contest is, therefore, really one between the respective
creditors of each unit. This problem is considered under the next heading.
E. Competing Equities of Each Unit's Creditors..
A difficult problem which arises when the parent corporation and its "adjunct"
subsidiary are assimilated concerns the general or unsecured creditors of the two
o' The Supreme Court's decision in the famous Deep Rock case has become, and seems destined to
remain, the cynosure in this mattter of the equities of rival claimants in the intercorporate community.
Taylor v. Standard Gas Co., 3o6 U. S. 307 (939). Here it was found that the subsidiary was under-
capitalized and was the victim of mismanagement and spoliation by the parcnt, and that the affairs of
the two units had been commingled. The parent held an enormous claim for advances to the subsidiary.
In corporate reorganization procedings under the Bankruptcy Act a plan of reorganization was filed
under which the parent's claim was compromised and the subsidiary's nonvoting preferred shareholders
received very little. The plan was held to be unfair and judicial confirmation was denied. The parent's
claim, it was decided, musf be subordinated to the equity of the subsidiary's preferred shareholders.
The decision vindicates the prophecy made in Note, Priority Between Parent Corporation and Preferred
Stockholders of Its Bankrupt Subsidiary, 36 Mics. L. REv. 88 0937).
Two years later the court rendered another decision to the same effect. Consolidated Rock Co. v.
Du Bois, 312 U. S. 550 (941). Here the court found that the subsidiary had "abdicated" and that
the parent had "directly" managed the subsidiary as a "mere department." A plan of corporate reorgani-
zation under which the parent's assets were insulated from the claims of the subsidiary's bondholders
was, accordingly, held to be unfair, and judicial confirmation was denied. Accord: Re Commonwealth
Light & Power Co., r4r F. 2d 734 (7th Cir. 1944) (stressing inadequate capitalization of the sub-
sidiary).
In X948 the Court was asked once again to invoke the Deep Rock doctrine, but refused to do so.
Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U. S. 211 (948). The justices observed that the
Deep Rock case was based on the particular equities there presented. A majority of them felt that
the instant case lacked the equities present in the earlier cases. Four of the justices thought otherwise
and dissented vigorously.
Much ink has been spilled over this subject. See Israels, The Implications and Limitations of the
Deep Rock Doctrine, 42 COL. L. Ray. 376 (942); Krotinger, The Deep Rock Doctrine: A Realistic
Approach to Parent-Subsidiary Late, 42 COL. L. REv. 1124 (1942); Sprecher, The Conflict of Equities
Under the Deep Rock Doctrine, 43 COL. L. REv. 336 (943); Bayne, The Deep Rock Doctrine Re-
considered, i9 FoaDhAm L. REV. 43, 152 (s950); Note, The Deep Rock Doctrine: Inexorable Command
or Equitable Remedy?, 47 COL. L. Rav. 8oo (1947); Note, Limiting the Deep Rock Doctrine, 58 YALE
L. J. 773 (1949); Note, Deep Rock Duz Everything, 29 Tax L. REV. 75 (1950).
The Deep Rock doctrine has been well received and has been much praised. For example, see
Krotinger, supra, at 1146: "The Deep Rock case has the potentiality of setting the law of parent-subsidiary
claims on a realistic plane. Even from the meagre line of rulings made since the Supreme Court
handed down that decision, it is apparent that the claims of the dominant stockholder in a subsidiary
or "one-man" corporation will be more closely scrutinized with a view to setting equitable limitations on
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units. Three facets of the problem are revealed. The first is the situation in which
the parent corporation is insolvent and the subsidiary is solvent. The second is the
situation in which the parent corporation is solvent and the subsidiary is insolvent.
The third is the situation in which both the parent and the subsidiary are insolvent.
In the first case (insolvent parent, solvent subsidiary), the assets of the subsidiary
are regarded as assets of the parent for purposes of administration. 0 5 The parent's
receiver or trustee in bankruptcy is entitled to take charge of and administer the
subsidiary's assets,'06 and creditors of the parent may have a receiver appointed for
the subsidiary.1 7  The basic qualification is, however, that the rights of the sub-
sidiary's creditors may not be impaired. They are entitled to priority in the sub-
sidiary's assets. Those assets are treated as a separate fund for the benefit of the
subsidiary's creditors, and the balance left after satisfying them goes to the parent for
the satisfaction of its creditors. 08
Conversely, in the second case (solvent parent, insolvent subsidiary), the sub-
sidiary's creditors should not be permitted to jeopardize the rights of the parent's
creditors 0D
In the third case (parent and subsidiary both insolvent), the struggle of con-
the use of the debtor-creditor relationship. It is the writer's belief that we shall see a more discriminating
approach to questions of subordination, with a view to a more accurate shaping of the remedy to meet
the needs of the individual case." See also Note, 54 HAsv. L. Rav. 1045, 1051 (1941).
A dissenting voice in the chorus of praise is Bayne, supra, at xS, who concludes his elaborate
analysis with the comment that "the most prudent and guarded course would be, it is submitted,
abandonment of the holding as a doctrine capable of accurate and intelligent application to facts and
circumstances in litigation."
...Re Eilers Music House, 270 Fed. 915 (9 th Cir. xg2i) (there was apparently "intermingling" of
intercorporate affairs here); Day v. Postal Telegraph Co., 66 Md. 354, 7 Ad. 6o8 (1887) (subsidiary
undercapitalized, no separate accounts kept, parent by direct intervention managed property of subsidiary
without consulting latter's directors). See Re Muncie Pulp Co., 139 Fed. 546 (2d Cir. 19o5).
... Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 77 F. 2d 478 (8th Cir. 1935) (subsidiary sales company
considered an adjunct or department of the parent because the latter's president "had the power to re-
move any officer or director of the sales company without consideration or notice, and to dominate and
control performance of its contracts"); Central Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Caldwell, 58 F. ad 721,
735 (8th Cir. 1932): "We think the relationship existing between the two corporations was of such
character and the intermingling of assets so extensive that the trial court was right in directing the
bankrupt's receiver to take charge of the whole assets pending further action by the court, and that
justice to all parties interested will best be done by such procedure."
2
07 Trustees System Co. of Pennsylvania v. Payne, 65 F. 2d 103 (3d Cir. 1933). Here creditors of
the insolvent parent, which was in the hands of a receiver, requested the court to appoint receivers
for a string of solvent subsidiaries. The court (p. X07) granted the request on the ground that the
parent and its subsidiaries "were not merely related by stock ownership but, like wheels in a machine,
were so closely meshed that all functioned together" and were "really one company."
10 Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 77 F. 2d 478 (8th Cir. 1935). See Simon v. Chambless, 86
F. 2d 569 (5th Cir. 1936). Cf. Re Clark Supply Co., Inc., and Re Todd Bldg. Corp., 172 F. 2d 248,
254 (7th Cir. 1949)-
"Hence, where an instrumentality relationship has been found, the courts have disregarded the
subsidiary's corporate entity and allowed the receiver (of the parent] to assume direct control over the
assets held by the affiliate as property of the parent." However, "the subsidiary's creditors will be
completely protected by according them priority in the assets taken over," whereas "the parent's creditors
may benefit from the increment in value resulting from an at least temporary preservation of the system."
Note, 46 HAsy. L. Rav. 823, 827 (1933).
'"Note, 46 HAsv. L. REv. 823, 825 (1933). See Rembar, Claims Against Ailiated Companies in
Reorganization, 39 COL. L. Rrv. 907, 912 (1939).
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flicting equities reaches its climax. The available authority yields no definitive
answer on this specific issue.'10 One possible solution, which might lead to quixotic
results if indiscriminately applied, is to lump together the assets of both units and
permit the creditors of both units to share this common fund pro rata."' Another
solution, which would better accord with prevailing concepts in other legal areas,
is to assemble the respective assets of the parent and subsidiary into two separate
funds and give each set of creditors priority in its particular fund. The parent's
creditors receive priority in the parent's assets, and the subsidiary's creditors receive
priority in the subsidiary's assets." 2 In the analogous situation when a partnership
and the partners are all insolvent, the majority common law rule, the Uniform Part-
nership Act, and the Bankrupcy Act adopt a similar arrangement whereby the assets
are marshaled as follows: The partnership creditors enjoy priority in the partnership
assets, and the individual creditors of each partner enjoy priority in that partner's
personal assets.113
The foregoing principles serve merely as general guides. Their chief virtues are
their relative certainty, ease of application, and comparative fairness. It is not
humanly possible, of course, to frame a set of rules which can be uniformly applied
1
o See Note, 46 HAxv. L. REv. 823, 825 n. 13 (933). Cf. Re Fox West Coast Theatres, 88 F. 2d
212 (9th Cir. 1937). In Henry v. Dolley, 99 F. 2d 94 (xoth Cir. 1938), this question was raised by
counsel, but the court avoided deciding the issue. In this case the insolvent parent's claim against its
insolvent "adjunct" subsidiary was subordinated to the claims of the subsidiary's other creditors. The
court said (p. 97): "Counsel for the Telephone Company further assert that it would be inequitable to
the creditors of the Telephone Company to subordinate its claim to the claims of other general creditors
of the bankrupt. No creditor of the Telephone Company has intervened in the proceeding and there
is no showing that the subordination of the Telephone Company's claim would prejudice its creditors.
The trustees of the Telephone Company have not asserted that the assets of that company and the
bankrupt should be consolidated and the several creditors of the two companies placed on a parity, and
that relief has not been sought either by the trustees or by any creditor of the Telephone Company. This
being true, we are of the opinion that the claim must be disposed of on a consideration of the rights of
the Telephone Company and the creditors of the bankrupt."
... ELVIN R. LArry, SUBSIIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 154 (1936): "Perhaps the fairest way
of dealing with the situation when both the parent and subsidiary corporations are insolvent is to let all
the creditors of each share pro rata in the pooled assets of both. Such procedure would be especially
equitable where the claimants are creditors of both the parent and the subsidiary."
"A good discussion is found in Note, The Deep Rock Doctrine: Inexorable Command or Equitable
Remedy?, 47 COL. L. PEv. 8oo, 811 ff. (1947). The writer presents three possible solutions in cases
where both units are insolvent and the parent is pressing a claim as creditor for advances to the subsidiary:
(i) let the parent share as creditor for the benefit of its creditors; (2) subordinate the parent's claim
for the benefit of the subsidiary's creditors; (3) pool the assets of both units and permit all the creditors
to share pro rata in the common fund. He then says: "It is possible, and indeed may be necessary, to
combine (3) with either (r) or (2) in order to achieve a just solution."
Note, Parent Corporation's Claim in Bankruptcy of Subsidiary, 54 Htmv. L. REv. 1045, 1050 (1941):
"This problem is particularly acute when the parent is also insolvent; the conflict is then between two
sets of creditors, both of which may include public investors. Although the cases have attached little
significance to the insolvency of the parent, it might be argued that in such a situation advances up to
what would be an adequate capital should be treated, in effect, as capital contributions, and that thereafter
claims for which the subsidiary received and retained a fair consideration should be given the status of
debts."
... Farmers' & Mechanics' National Bank v. Ridge Avenue Bank, 240 U. S. 498 (1916); Rodgers v.
Meranda, 7 Ohio X8o (x857); UNuFo"I PARrNERSnP Acr §4 o(h)(i), 7 U. L. A. §4o(h)(i) (1922).
Contra: Robinson v. Security Co., 87 Conn. 268, 87 At. 879 (1913), which applies the "minority
common law rule."
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with complete fairness to every situation which may arise. This area is, manifestly,
one of delicate shadings and refined equities. The elemental wisdom of deciding
within the factual framework and individual merits of each case applies with full
force. The particular circumstances of a case may well justify or require a depart-
ure from a prescribed general scheme of marshaling.
A court, vexed with the difficulty of these problems, may be quick to seize upon
a particular circumstance as an equity which favors one group of creditors at the
expense of the others. For example, in one case the court allowed the insolvent
parent's creditors to share in the insolvent subsidiary's assets together with the sub-
sidiary's creditors, because the latter became creditors with knowledge that the
subsidiary was a mere adjunct of the parent n 4 Likewise, another court indicates
that under certain circumstances the insolvent subsidiary's creditors may exhaust its
assets and then share for the balance of their claims in the insolvent parent's assets
together with the parent's creditors." 5 In still another case it appeared that if the
assets of parent and subsidiary were segregated, and each unit's creditors were given
priority in their respective funds, a grossly unfair distribution would result. 18 Ac-
cordingly, the court, in order to permit a more equitable distribution, consolidated
the bankruptcy proceedings against the parent and the subsidiary and pooled the
assets of both units for pro rata sharing by all the creditors. 7
" New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transport Co., 56 F. 2d 580 (2d Cit. X932).
... See Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 77 F. 2d 478, 491 (8th Cir. 1935).
. Stone v. Eacho, 127 F. 2d 284, :288 (4 th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 3X7 U. S. 635 (1942): "If
the Virginia corporation is treated as a separate entity and the property used in the Richmond business
is applied to its debts, and the claim of the Delaware corporation is postponed, in accordance with the
ruling below, those creditors who have dealt with the Richmond store and have proven claims in the
Virginia proceeding, will have their claims practically paid in full, whereas other creditors of the Dela-
ware corporation will receive less than 30% on their claims in the bankruptcy proceeding pending in
New Jersey. If on the other hand, the Virginia corporation is treated as a separate entity and the claim
of the Delaware corporation is not postponed, this claim will so far absorb the assets at Richmond that
other creditors proving in the Virginia proceeding will receive less than half the dividend received by
creditors in the New Jersey proceeding. Only by entirely ignoring the separate corporate entity of the
Virginia corporation and consolidating the proceedings here with those of the parent corporation in
New Jersey can all the creditors receive that equality of treatment which it is the purpose of the bank-
ruptcy act to afford; and this, we think, is the course that should be followed."
"' Stone v. Eacho, supra. The court said (p. 288): 'It is too well settled to admit of argument
that the claims of a parent corporation against a subsidiary should be thus postponed where the subsidiary,
as here, has in reality no separate existence, is not adequately capitalized, and constitutes a mere in-
strumentality of the parent corporation or a mere 'corporate pocket' or department of its business ...
And even in the case of the insolvency of both corporations there may be reason for recognizing the
separate entity of the subsidiary and postponing the claim of the parent, where the subsidiary has been
allowed to transact business as an independent corporation and credit has been extended to it as such
on the faith of its ownership of the assets in its possession. LAtrY, SuBsmimuEs AND AsF'sitaTED
CO, Oa MNS 153-155. But in a case such as this, where both corporations are insolvent, where the
business has been transacted by and the credit extended to the parent corporation, and where the
subsidiary has no real existence whatever, there is no reason why the courts should not face the realities
of the situation and ignore the subsidiary for all purposes, allowing the creditors of both corporations
to share equally in the pooled assets." See Sprecher, The Conflict of Equities Under the Deep Rock
Doctrine, 43 COL. L. REv. 336, 352 (1943); Krotinger, The Deep Rock Doctrine: A Realistic Approach
to Parent-Subsidiary Law, 42 CoL. L. Rav. 1124, 1142f. (1942); Israels, The Implications and Limita-
tions of the Deep Rock Doctrine, 42 COL. L. REv. 376, 388, 389, 393 (1942); Rembar, Claims Against
Affiliated Companies in Reorganization, 39 COL. L. REV. 907, 919 f. (1939).
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Future action in this arena of legal controversy will, therefore, depend more
upon judicial sensitivity to the equities of a case than upon the verbal sweep of
general rules.1'8
A similar situation and a decision to the same effect will be found in Re Associated Gas & Elec. Co.,
149 F. 2d 996 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 736 (945), where the court was moved by
the desire to protect the subsidiary's, rather than the parent's, creditors.
"' "Equity looks in all directions. Only in that way can the various interests in the corporate com-
munity be adequately protected." Justice Murphy, dissenting, in Comstock v. Group of Institutional
Investors, 335 U. S. 211, 238 (1948).
